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"EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW":
THE EVOLUTION OF A
NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO
LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR
AND A STUDY OF ITS IMPACT
ON NEW JERSEY LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
James B. Ventantonio*

To many, equal justice under the law means unhindered access

to the legal system. This access is of vital importance to the stability
of our society. As Reginald Heber Smith observed:
Nothing rankles more in the human heart than a brooding sense
of injustice. Illness we can put tip with; but injustice makes us want
to pull things down. 1

The federal legal services projects, funded out of the Office of

Economic Opportunity, were established inI response to the fears
that, after decades of neglect and abuse from the legal system, the
poor of this nation might in fact "pull things down." The experience
of the sixties indicates how close we came.
The federal program has, for the most part, been successful in
providing individual representation for the poor as well as in bringing
about beneficial changes in laws which directly or indirectly affect
them. This article will attempt to acquaint the reader with the diffi* B.A., Seton Hall

University; J.D., Seton Hall University School of Law. The

author is currently the Director and Professor of Clinical Programs at Seton Hall University School of Law. He has been actively involved with Legal Services since 1968
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The author wishes to acknowledge the substantial contribution of John Zen Jackson
of the New Jersey, Bar to the preparation, research, and writing of this article.
I Smith, Introduction to E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES xiii
(1951).
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culties Legal Services programs faced in the developing years, their
successes, and the fiture of the program as a National Legal Services
Corporation becomes viable. Particular areas in which additional reform is needed will be discussed and, in the final part of the article,
recent developments in New Jersey landlord-tenant law will be analyzed as an example of what changes Legal Services attorneys
can effect.
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND SURVIVAL
OF ORGANIZED LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR

Early Developments

The need for some kind of legal assistance program for the poor
was first recognized and acted upon during the late nineteenth centurv. 2 Legal aid societies of varying structures and purposes began
appearing in the nation's cities, expanding slowly throughout the next
sixty years. 3 But, as late as 1965, the services rendered, although
2

Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipovertq Program, 31

LAW &

CON-

TEMP. PROB. 211, 212 (1966). For an in-depth discussion of the development of legal
aid in the United States see E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951
& Supp. 1961) [hereinafter cited as BROWNELL]. For a recent definitive work on Legal
Services see E. JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM (1974) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON].
3 BROwNELL,

specific

groups,

supra note
such

as

2, at 7-11. The earliest legal aid societies served only

German

immigrants

(New

York's

Der Deutsche

Rechts-

Schnitz Verein founded in 1876) and women (Chicago's Protective Agency for Women
and Children founded in 1886). JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 4-5. See J. MAGUIRE,
LANCE OF JUSTICE 27-48 (1928).
In

1890, the German Society organization

removed all prior restrictions on eligi-

bility for its services except that of' poverty. Id. at 58. This was the advent of the New
York Legal Aid Society and, in 1896, the name was formally changed to indicate its
true purpose. Id. at 3.
At the end of the 19th century, only the New York society and two Chicago societies were in existence. Smith, The Relation Between Legal Aid Work and the Administration of Justice, 45 A.B.A. REP. 217, 224 (1920). The total number of cases
handled Iy these organizations had increased from approximately 5,600 in 1888 to
over 16,000 in 1899. BROWNELL, supra note 2, Table XVIII, at 167. The first two decades of the twentieth century witnessed a gradual expansion of legal aid and, by
1917, forty-one societies had been established, Smith, supra at 224, while the numher of cases handled annually exceeded 100,000. BROXVNELL, supra note 2, at 8.
Throughout the 1920's, the growth of the legal aid movement was "quiet and
steady" with seventy-five legal aid organizations in existence at the end of 1928. Report of the Standing Committee on Legal Aid Work, 54 A.B.A. REP. 380, 380-81 & App.
A, at 382-83 (1929). The early depression years brought a rapid increase in the number
of clients. However, the financial support at this time was insufficient to accommodate this swelling workload. The resultant effect was that, with the number of cases
to be handled far exceeding the facilities available, "clients became tired of waiting
and tired of inadequate service," JOHNSON, smpra note 2, at 8, and the number of
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performed in good faith, were able to reach only ten percent of those
who needed them. 4 In response to the recognized need for organized
legal services, and the clear inability of the legal aid societies to meet
the growing demand, 5 in 1965, the Office of Economic Opportunity
6
set up the first federally funded legal services program.
cases handled by legal aid organizations actually dropped between 1933 and 1937.
BROWNELL, suIsra note 2, Table XVIII, at 168. During the latter part of the depression era, the number of cases handled began to rise, and by 1940 there were 118 legal aid societies or bar association committees actively giving legal aid. Report of the
Standing Committee on Legal Aid \Work, 65 A.B.A. REP. 187, 188 (1940). World War
II prevented the expansion of the programs, but the increasingly vocal support of the
organized bar in tbe late forties and early fifties aided in obtaining increased funding
for the legal aid movement. See Pye, supra note 2, at 212; Voorhees, Legal Aid: Past,
Present and Future, 56 A.B.A.J. 765, 765-66 (1970). There were 210 legal aid organizations in 1959, but, because of the population explosion, the existing legal aid organizations were still unable adequately to handle the workload. Report of the Standing
Committee on Legal Aid Work, 85 A.B.A. REP. 479, 480-81 (1960).
4Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
381, 410 (1965).
5 Note, Legal Services-Past and Present, 39 CORNELL L. REV. 960, 960 & n.3
(1974). The problems which faced the legal aid societies revolved around the need
for funding:
Largely because Legal Aid has been underfinanced and understaffed, it frequently does not take certain types of cases, such as divorces and bankruptcies, or takes them only under emergency circmnstances. The Legal Aid societies often have had to shorten office hours and to set eligibility requirements too strictly . . . simply as a device to keep the caseload down.
Note, Neighborhood Laic Offices: The New Watue in Legal Services for the Poor. 80
HARV. L. REX'. 805, 817 (1967) (footnote omitted).
6 Although the majority of legal aid societies were privately funded, several publicly funded organizations were established quite early in the movement. See BROWNil C0;o-tr0Versy
ELL, supi note 2, at 92. The question of appropriate tinding had beei
since 1920 when the American Bar Association first seriously considered legal aid.
Compare Hughes, Legal Aid Societies, Their Function and Necessity, 45 A.B.A. REP.
227, 232-35 (1920) with Tustin, The Relation of Legal Aid to the Municipality, 45
A.B.A. REP. 236, 239-40 (1920). The controversy intensified when the British Legal
Aid and Advice Act of 1949, 12 & 13 Geo. 6, c. 51, was enacted. This act created a systell whereby the government compensated private attorneys who had handled cases
fior people who could not afford to pay for legal services, and its implementation had
taken place during a period of our history when any federal government action was
viewed with disdain. JOHNSON, siUira note 2, at 17-18.
The result was that a majority of the members of the bar embraced the philosophy of private as opposed to public financing of legal aid since it was believed that
the latter would lead to a socialization of the legal profession. Id. at 18; Miller, Lawyers and Judges and Legal Aid, 38 J. Am. JUD. SOC. 15, 19-20 (1954). This was the
dominant view through the 1950's and, as a result, there were fewer sunicipal legal
aid organizations in 1962 than there had been in 1919. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 1718. However, the increasing workload of legal aid societies in the 1960's and the
greater acceptance of tile War on Poverty tended to soften the opposition to federal
monetary assistance. See Voorhees, The OEO Legal Services Program: Should the
Bar Support It?, 53 A.B.A.J. 23, 23-26 (1967); Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: The
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Although the American Bar Association immediately voted to
support the federally funded Legal Services Program, 7 the organized
bar had, prior to that time, made a barely colorable attempt to service the legal needs of the poor. 8 Voices of the bar had, of course,
been raised in concern. The National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) was formed over fifty years ago to assist the handful
of attorneys aiding indigents through legal aid societies and criminal
defense work. 9 In conjunction with the ABA Standing Committee on
Legal Aid, the NLADA attempted to increase the sensitivity of local
and state bar associations to the needs of indigents. 10 Without the
lonely struggle of NLADA and a very few other organizations and individuals over the past fifty years, organized legal services may never
have come to fruition in the OEO program.
OEO--Office of Legal Services
As part of its War on Poverty, the federal government assumed
the burden of financing legal services through the Community Action
Program (CAP), established by the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964.11 The relationship between CAP and the Office of Legal Services was rocky from the beginning because of the degree of control
the local Community Action Agency had over the funding of a legal
services project. 1 2 In 1966, Congress modified the ties between the
New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REv. 805, 805-06 (1967). See
generally Parker, The Impact of Federal Funding on Legal Aid, 10 CALIF. W.L. REV.
503 (1974).
7 Report of the Board of Governors, 1965 ,MidyearMeeting, 90 A.B.A. REP. 140-41
(1965).
8 In 1963 only .2% of the money spent on legal services went toward legal services for the poor. Carlin & Howard, su pra note 4, at 410. The poor rarely used lawyers
and when they did, they were often forced to use lawyers of questionable professional
qualities and ethical standards. Id. at 384-86.
9 JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 7 & n.30. The original organization, the National
Association of Legal Aid Organizations, was formed in 1923 at the recommendation
of Reginald Heber Smith in his now classic work, Justice and the Poor. Id. at 7.
10 ld. at 7-8.
11 Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452, 78 Stat. 508 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2701-981 (1970)).
The Legal Services program was not specifically created in the 1964 Act but was
established in 1965 by virtue of an amendment to the Act which broadened the scope
of funding to include CAP programs other than those specifically mentioned in the
statute. Act of Oct. 9, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-253, tit. I, § 12, 79 Stat. 974. See Pious,
Congress, The Organized Bar, and the Legal Services Program, 1972 Wis. L. REV. 418,
423.
12 Note, Legal Seruices-Past and Present, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 960, 963 (1974).
For example, the CAP refused to approve proposals for local programs without the
approval of nine reviewers who were not members of the Legal Services staff. JOHNSON,
supra note 2, at 140.
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two offices and provided for direct congressional appropriations to the
Office of Legal Services. 13
The stated objectives of the Legal Services Program included
educating the poor as to their substantive rights, sponsoring research
in areas of the law affecting the poor, reforming the law, and "acquaint[ing] the whole practicing bar with its essential role in coinbating poverty."' 14 The program provided funding to local private
nonprofit organizations which operated in an identifiable location or
geographic area and which agreed to meet certain guidelines.' 5 The
administration, structure, and scope of the local program, however,
was to be determined by the local project.16 Many of the existing
legal aid societies received funding and hundreds of' new offices
were established.17 The offices were located in storefronts, public
buildings, trailers, and converted warehouses. In short, neighborhood Legal Services offices were placed for ready access by the clientele served, and their hours established for the convenience of
those clients.18 Clients who qualified under OEO-established guide13 Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-794, § 211-1(b), 80 Stat. 1462, as aOlieided,
Act of 1)ec. 23, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, § 225(b), 81 Stat. 702 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 21(b) (1970)) (repealed 1974) (now 42 U.S.C. § 2996 ct seq. (Stipp. IV, 1975)).
14

OFFICE

OF

ECONOMIC

OPPORTUNITY,

GUIDELINES

FOR

LEGAL

SERVICES

PROGRAMS 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 GUIDELINES].

15 OEO funded many associations which were already in existence. But
ceive such funding, the organization was required to include representatives
poor on the project's board of directors in order to comply with section 202(a)(3)
Economic Opportunity Act which mandated " 'maximum feasible participation
residents of the areas and members of the groups served.' " 1967 GUIDELINES,
note 14, at 4.

to reof the
of the
of the
.supra

16 See Pye, suipra note 2, at 223.

Various kinds of services were funded as a result, ranging from the traditional individualized services-only approach to research back-up units. See Note, supra note
12, at 961-62.
17 By 1967, OEO had made grants to 300 agencies in 210 cities. JOHNSON, .s'upra
note 2, at 99. In 1971, 40% of the OEO-finded projects were run by legal aid societies which had been established before the OEO program. I EVALUATION DIVISION,
OEO, EVALUATION OF OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM FINAL REPORT, at 11-3 (1971).
18 For general discussion of the neighborhood concept see Pye, supra note 2, at
231-43; Note, supra note 6. The experience of two privately funded neighborhood
legal services programs established in the early sixties, in New Haven and New York,
served as models for the development of' later OEO programs. See JOHNSON, supra
note 2, at 21-27. The successes and failures of the New Haven project were evaluated
by Jean and Edgar Cahn in their now classic article, The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
By placing the law offices in the neighborhoods, instead of in the downtown
areas near the courts where legal aid offices were traditionally located, it was hoped
that access to legal services would be increased and the hostility toward the legal systen would be diminished. See J. HANDLER, NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES-NEW
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lines' 9 were not charged any fees for services rendered and were

represented in all but criminal matters.
In the ten years of the program's existence, it has expanded from
247 legal aid offices handling 414,000 cases 20 to 638 offices handling
over one and a half million cases annually.21 The scope of the services
available to clients ranged from simple advice to appellate representation and legislative advocacy. No restrictions were placed on the
classes of defendants against whom Legal Services attorneys could
litigate, and the local programs were often encouraged to actively
participate in attempts to reform the law to make the system fairer

DIMENSIONS IN THE LAW 4 (L. Wells ed. 1966). Although experience has not shown
that the neighborhood concept actually increased access to the system, the drawrbacks
of the inefficiency of scattered offices may be offset by the benefits gained from a
minimization of the alienation of the neighborhood residents. K. FISHER & C. IVIE,
FRANCHISING

PROGRAM
1971).

JUSTICE:

AND

THE OFFICE OF

TRADITIONAL

ECONOMIC

LEGAL AID

17-18

OPPORTUNITY

(American

Bar

LEGAL

SERVICES

Foundation

Series

19The only requirement was that the applicant be unable to pay for a lawyer.
1967 GUIDELINES, soupra note 14, at 7. The original income guidelines thus varied

from project. to project because of the different economic conditions in the different
areas of the country, but the average cut-off point for a family of four was an annual
income of $3,600. JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 100. For an in-depth analysis of the financial and subject matter eligibility criteria applied by the various legal aid organizations see Silverstein, Eligibility for Free Legal Services in Civil Cases, 44 J. URB. L.
549 (1967).
The Legal Services Corporation Act places the responsibility for establishing
eligibility guidelines for grant recipients on the Corporation and mandates that the
following factors be considered in setting eligibility standards:
(i) the liquid assets and income level of the client,
(ii) the fixed debts, medical expenses, and other factors which affect
the client's ability to pay,
(iii) the cost of living in the locality, and
(iv) such other factors as relate to financial inability to afford legal assistance, which shall include evidence of a prior determination, which shall
be a disqualifying factor, that such individual's lack of income results from
refusal or unwillingness, without good cause, to seek or accept an employment situation ....

42 U.S.C. § 2996f(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1975).
20 Pye, supra note 2, at 212-13.
2i Arnold, And Finally, 342 Days Later . . . , 5 JURIS DOCTOR, Sept. 1975, at 32.
In 1971, the reported case load was 1,237,275. NLADA, STATISTICS OF LEGAL ASSISTANCE WORK IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, at v (1971).

The contributions of the OEO Legal Services Program have been significant
both qualitatively and quantitatively. In a 1971 report, it was estimated that in 1970
the Program doubled the number of cases handled and provided over twice the access
which would have been afforded by organized legal aid in cases which involved more
than just advice. I EVALUATION DIVISION, OEO, EVALUATION OF OFFICE OF ECONOMIC

OPPORTUNITY

LEGAL

SERVICES

PROGRAM

FINAL

REPORT,

at

IV-52

(1971).
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and more responsive to the poor. 2 2 Law reform activities included
class actions, impact litigation, group organization and representation,
the creation of specialized legal units, and the development of legal
23
educational programs for the poor.
Legal Services' Successes
Since representation was provided for all civil matters which
were not fee-generating, the cases brought covered a wide spectrum.
The most easily identifiable and heavily litigated areas were welfare,
landlord-tenant, fiamily, and consumer law.
As one of the prime influences in a poor person's life, public
welfare programs quickly became the targets of Legal Services law
reform activities. Many of these programs had apparently been structured so as to make it as difficult as possible for a recipient to obtain
desperately needed benefits. In the late sixties, exclusively as the result of the work of Legal Services attorneys, the Supreme Court
reached three decisions which revolutionized the welfare programs
22 See 1967 GUIDELINES, supra note 14, at 7.

23 There has been considerable controversy over the propriety of law-reform
activities, although the purposes of legal aid have long been recognized as
first to secure legal justice in the individual case for the person unable to
retain a lawyer, and second to promote social justice by initiating and supporting measures for the advancement of the cause of legal justice for poor
persons.
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE WELFARE COUNCIL
OF NEW YORK CITY, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF LE-

CAL AID 95 (1928). Critics have attacked the policy because "diversion

of resources
to law reform involves making a choice between two groups of potential beneficiaies" which "choice between clients is not contemplated in the ethics and conventions defining the lawyer's role," and because of the questionable policy "of constituting a publicly funded agency to lobby for the special benefit of a limited sector of
the general community.'' Hazard, Late Reforiing in the Anti-Poverty Effort, 37
U. CHI. L. REV. 242, 253 (1970). See also Boarman, Issues Concerning Legal Sercices, reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 6034, 6041-46 (1973). However, the policy has
been vigorously supported. See, e.g., Hannon, The Leadership Problem in the Legal
Services Program, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 235 (1969); Shriver, Late Reform and the
Poor, 17 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1967).

The opposition to the law reform activities of the Legal Services projects is unwarranted:
Indeed, lawyers serving private clients have traditionally engaged in law reform activities, challenging statutes, bringing test cases, instituting class actions for shareholders and otherwise seeking to change existing legal patterns on their clients' behalf. The poor would seem entitled to no less. In
the final analysis, law reform is no more than a lawyer performing his ethical
and professional duty for his client.
ABA,

THE

omitted).

CORPORATION

FOR

LEGAL

SERVICES:

A

STUDY

14

(1971)

(footnote
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throughout the nation. 2 4
In King v. Smith, 25 the Court struck down a state regulation
which denied welfare benefits to otherwise eligible children if their
mother cohabited with an able-bodied male adult, regardless of
whether he was legally responsible for their support. 26 A year later,
residency requirements for the receipt of welfare benefits were held
unconstitutional in Shapiro v. Thompson. 27 Finally, in 1970, the Supreme Court, recognizing the importance of welfare assistance once
granted, mandated in Goldberg v. Kelly 28 that due process required
that welfare recipients be -afforded notice and a hearing before bene29
fits could be terminated.
The intense and successful litigation of welfare cases at the
federal 30 and state 3' levels forced an expansion of services within
existing governmental programs. Howard Phillips, former acting
director of OEO and an outspoken opponent of the Legal Services
Program, stated that over 5.5 million Americans were added to the
32
welfare rolls because of the actions of poverty lawvers.
Legal Services attorneys have also been instrumental in making
the judiciary sensitive to the vulnerability of the poor in other areas,
such as consumer abuse. 3 For instance, Legal Services of Greater
24 This was

particularly significant because, until 1965, apparently no legal aid

cases had been appealed to the Supreme Court. See JOHNSON, supra note 2, at 189 &
n. 2 2. For a criticism of the approach taken by the Legal Services attorneys see
Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize a Right to Welfare: A Study in
the Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 58 NIINN. L. REx. 211 (1973).
25392 U.S. 309 (1968).
26 Id. at 333-34.
27 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969).
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
29 Id. at 261-64.
30 See, e.g., Rhode Island Fair Welfare Rights Organization v. Department of
Social & Rehabilitative Serv., 329 F. Supp. 860, 870-71 (D.R.I. 1971) (elimination
of certain items from needs category in state AFDC program violative of federal
statutory mandate); Boddie v. Wyman, 323 F. Supp. 1189, 1190, 1194 (N.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 434 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1970) (state enjoined from discriminating geographically
in distribution of welfare grants).
31See, e.g., Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 761, 433 P.2d 697, 716, 63 Cal. Rptr.
689, 708 (1967) (state could not reduce minimum coverage nor entirely eliminate
certain services in Medi-Cal program); State ex rel. Sell v. Milwaukee County, 65
Wis. 2d 219, 225, 222 N.W.2d 592, 595 (1974) (state policy requiring welfare recipients to sell all motor vehicles held invalid).
32
See Hearings on H.R. 3641, H.R. 3175, and H.R. 3147 Before the Subcomn.
on Equal Opportunities of the House Comni. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 309 (1973).
33

See

D. CAPLOVITZ,

CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE 6,

184 n.8, 192 n.2, 226 & n.1

(1974). Among the successful actions were Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970)
(bankrupt wage earners' uncollected vacation pay does not go to trustee in bank-
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Miami successfully argued the due process necessity of notice before
replevin in Fuentes v. Shevin.3 4 This increased judicial sensitivity
has also been evident in landlord-tenant law where Legal Services
35 Edwards v. Habib,3 6
cases such as Brown v. Southall Realty Co.,
and Marini v. Ireland3 7 have significantly expanded the rights of
tenants and low-income residents. 3 8 Exclusionary zoning practices
have also been successfully attacked by Legal Services attorneys,
most significantly in the recent cases of Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel,3 9 and Metropolitan Hous40
ing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights.

ruptcy); Abbit v. Bernier, 387 F. Supp. 57, 62 (D. Conn. 1974) (Connecticut's body
execution statute held violative of equal protection).
34 407 U.S. 67, 96--97 (1972). See also Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
341-42 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment of wages without notice and opportunity
for hearing is violative of due process). For an excellent discussion of the development
of the Fuentes case by the Greater Miami Legal Services Program see Abbott & Peters,
Fuentes v. Shevin: A Narrative of Federal Test Litigation in the Legal Services Program, 57 IOWA L. REV. 955 (1972).
35 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). The court of appeals held that in a possessory action for nonpayment of rent, the tenant may raise the defense of illegality of
contract where serious building code violations were known to exist at the time of
the letting. Id. at 837.
36397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). A landlord's
eviction of a tenant in retaliation for complaints she had made to the authorities about
violations of the housing code was held illegal. 397 F.2d at 699.
3756 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). Marini held that a defendant may raise the equitable defense of the landlord's failure to provide an apartment in habitable condition in
a summary dispossess action. For an extensive discussion of this case see notes 181-90
infra and accompanying text.
3 Other significant housing cases include: javins v.First Nat'! Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (local housing code
is part of landlord's warranty of habitability and cannot be waived by tenant); Turner
v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1260-61 (W.D.N.C. 1975) (foreclosure and sale statute held unconstitutional as applied because notice of waiver of rights in deed of
trust insufficient).
3. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 18 (1975).
For a more extensive discussion of this case see Mytelka & Mytelka, Exclusionary/ Zoning: A Consideration of Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1975). The potential impact of this
decision on landlord-tenant relationships is discussed at notes 346-49 infra and accoipanying text.
40517 F.2d 409, 415 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 560 (1975) (municipality's
refusal to grant zoning change to permit construction of low and middle income housing violative of equal protection).
Other actions hy Legal Services to expand access to housing for the poor include Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 867 (2d Cir. 1970)
(complaint alleging denial of due process in Housing Authority termination of tenancies states a claim); Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265
(2d Cir. 1968) (tenants of public housing authority may maintain class action challenging tenant selection processes as violative of due process); Western Addition Commu-
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PoliticalPressures
The success of Legal Services actions indicates that the courts,
often considered the most conservative element of the legal community, agreed that change had to come. Yet, from its inception, the
Legal Services Program has been a source of controversy. The bar
itself has been schizophrenic about the program. Although the American Bar Association Board of Governors has consistently supported
and defended the program as being in the best traditions of the bar, 4 1
this support has had to be rearticulated because the validity of Legal
Services has been challenged consistently by a number of local bar
associations.

Many individual attorneys saw the poverty lawyer as an economic
threat4 2 and the Legal Services Program as a dangerous step toward
the socialization of the bar. 43 These fears were eventually alleviated
when private attorneys found that the representation of indigents
brought about a growth in their own clientele because of increased
litigation and negotiation with poverty lawyers. Furthermore, as local
attorneys became acclimated to the operation of local Legal Services
offices, fears of socialization subsided.
nity Organization v. Weaver, 294 F. Supp. 433, 440 (N.D. Cal. 1968), injunction dissolved ias moot, 320 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (local urban renewal agency required to supply feasible plan for relocation of displaced persons).
41 The ABA had an interest in maintaining the viability of the OEO program because of its participation in the National Advisory Commission (NAC), whose members included officers of the ABA and the NLADA. Until 1971, the NAC played an
important role in bridging the gap between the OEO administration and the legal profession. See Pye & Garraty, The Involvement of the Bar in the War Against Poverty,
41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 860, 866 (1966); Note, supra note 12, at 972.
Although the Senate version of the Legal Services Corporation Bill contained a
provision for a 15-member National Advisory Council, no such provision appeared in
the House version, and the Senate conceded. H.R. REP. No. 93-1039, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 18 (1974).
42 Other reasons for opposition were:
(2) competition with existing legal assistance programs, (3) fear that federal
funding might result in federal control and lead to unethical conflicts of interest, and (4) fear that affiliation with the CAP would violate the Canons of
Ethics.
Note, supra note 12, at 971 n.59 (citing J. HANDLER, NEIGHBORHOOD LEGAL SERVICES-NEw DIMENSIONS IN THE LAW 11-12 (L. Wells ed. 1966)).
43 For example, two officers of the Tennessee Bar Association warned:

Cooperation or non-cooperation with O.E.O. policy-either one-leads
to socialism and destruction of the legal profession. The answer then must
lie in alteration of the program not participation in or resignation to it.
Bethel & Walker, Et Tu Brute!, TENN. BAR Assoc. J., Aug. 1965, at 11, 26. See also
Stumpf, Schoerluke & Dill, The Legal Profession and Legal Services: Exploration in
Local Bar Politics, 6 LAW & Soc'y REV. 47, 59 (1971); Note, supra note 6, at 843-45.
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Nonetheless, assaults on the Legal Services Program persisted.
The challenges came in the form of attempts by both state and federal
politicians to neutralize the effectiveness of Legal Services projects
44
through an alteration of the kinds of controls placed on them.
In California, for example, the success of California Rural Legal
Assistance in significant law reform activities 45 led Senator George
Murphy, with the encouragement of Governor Ronald Reagan, to
propose an amendment to OEO legislation pending in 1967 which
would have prohibited litigation by a Legal Services program against
any federal, state, or local agency. 4 6 The amendment was defeated,
but only because of the support of the leadership of the organized
bar.

47

Due to the need for periodic statutory renewal of OEO generally
and Legal Services specifically, the battle would be joined again and
again. In 1969, Senator Murphy introduced another amendment
which, rather than completely prohibiting litigation against government agencies, would have given the governor of a state an absolute
veto over the funding of any state Legal Services project. 4" The
amendment was passed by the Senate, 4 9 but was stopped in the
50
House, again because of the efforts of the ABA.
Soon thereafter, OEO attempted to implement a plan whereby the regional directors, a majority of whom were non-lawyer political appointees from the region they served, would assume most
of the duties of the Director of Legal Services.51 The Legal Services
44See

Note, The

Legal Services Corporation: Curtailing Political Interference,

81 YALE L.J. 231, 247-59 (1971).
4a5 alifornia hural Legal Assistance

(CRLA)
,as s.ccessf.l "n invalidating
"'Medi-Cal'" regulations which attempted to reduce the minimul coverage and elim-

inate certain services, thus forcing the restoration of $210 million in welfare grants.
See Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d 733, 433 P.2d 697, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1967). This
loss of state funds was politically damaging to Governor Reagan and, as a result, he
attempted to minimize the future activities of the CRLA. Note, su pra note 12, at 970
n,54.
For an extensive discussion of the continuing problems of CRLA see Falk & Pollak,
Political Interference with Publicly Funded Lawyers, The CRLA

Controuersy and

The Future of Legal Services, 24 IASTINGs L.J. 599 (1973).
1 See 113 CONG. REC. 27871-72 (1967).
47 Pious, supra note 11, at 427-29. See 113 CONG. REC. 27873 (1967).
48 115 CONG. REC. 29894-98 (1969). At that time, a governor did have a veto, but
such veto could be overridden by OEO. Act of Dec. 23, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-222, tit.
11, § 242, 81 Stat. 706, as amended, Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-177, tit. 1,
§ 107(a), 83 Stat. 830 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2834 (1970)).
49 115 CONG. REG. 29897-98 (1969).
50 Pious, supra note 11, at 430-31; Note, supra note 12, at 980 n.103.
51Sullivan, Law Reform and the Legal Services Crisis, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 25-26
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programs throughout the country, with the support of the organized
bar, resisted this move which would have greatly increased the vulnerability of the local projects to political pressure, a result which
Legal Services supporters had specifically wished to avoid. 52 After a
long and unpleasant dispute, regionalization was dropped. OEO
Director Donald Rumsfeld subsequently adopted a "decentralization" plan. This plan was also greeted with massive opposition, and
Rumsfeld finally dropped it two months later, but only after firing
the two top attorneys in the OEO Legal Services Program for their
alleged refusal to support the plan. 53 In response to these controversies, the Legal Services attorneys organized groups to combat the
Nixon Administration's growing assault upon the program.
In late 1970, following the abandonment of the regionalization
attempt, California once again became the focus of national attention
when Governor Reagan, alleging massive irregularities in its operation, vetoed the OEO grant to California Rural Legal Assistance. 5 4
The new OEO director, Frank Carlucci, appointed a panel to investigate the Governor's charges. The panel exonerated the project
of any wrong-doing and found that the charges were almost all fabrications or distortions. 55 OEO therefore overrode the Governor's veto
and California Rural Legal Assistance continued to function. 56
In 1972, the political control question again gained national
attention when Vice President Agnew became involved in a contro& nn.85-86 (1971). See also Arnold, Whither Legal Services, JuRIs DOCTOR, Feb.
1971, at 5-8.
52 Note, supra note 12, at 980-81.
53id. at 981 & n.109.
54 Falk & Pollak, supra note 45, at 610. The charges, published in a study which
became known as the Uhler Report, included disruption of the prison system, public
schools, and farm workers, violation of certain conditions of the OEO grant, and generally unethical conduct such as solicitation. See id. at 610-17.
55 Id. at 634-35.
56 Id. at 639. However, OEO Director Carlucci promised to make a new grant for
another experimental legal services project in California to "salve" the Governor's
wounded political ego. Id.
Unfortunately, the experience of CRLA demonstrates
[tlhe anomaly of placing this authority in the hands of an official who is one
of the most likely subjects of suits by [Legal Services] attorneys ....
Id. at 642. This problem is alleviated by the Legal Services Corporation Act, which
places the authority to make grants with the president of the Corporation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996f(e) (Stpp. V, 1975). But the governor of each state must appoint a state advisory
council to monitor the activities of the projects to insure compliance with provisions
of the Act, id. § 2996c(f), and the governor and state bar association must be notified
prior to the approval of a grant application at which time they may offer comments and
recommendations, although there is no veto power, id. § 2996f(f).
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versy with Camden Regional Legal Services (CRLS) in New Jersey.
The Camden office had instituted a suit on behalf of a community
coalition to insure that there would be significant provisions for lowincome housing and better housing for displaced blacks and Puerto
Ricans in Camden's proposed urban renewal project. 5 7 The ensuing
litigation halted the urban renewal project. 58 Claiming that CRLS
was trying to destroy the community, Camden city officials called upon
Vice President Agnew to apply pressure on the Legal Services program to withdraw the suit. Mr. Agnew eventually responded and,
against the advice of OEO officials, 5 9 summoned all parties to the
dispute to the old Executive Office Building in February 1972 for
what he termed "mediation." At this meeting he expressed the opinion that elected officials can better speak for Legal Services clients
because the officials " 'earned that right at the polls.' "60 The director of CRLS, David H. Dugan III, indicated to the Vice President
that he considered the attempt at mediation an unwarranted interference into a matter in litigation and refused to withdraw the suit.
Fred Speaker, the national director of Legal Services, supported
61
Dugan's decision, and the matter was eventually settled.
The Vice President continued his attacks on Legal Services. In
a controversial article published in the American Bar Association
Journal, he criticized the program for "expend[ing] much of its resources on efforts to change the law on behalf of one social class-the
poor. ' 62 He argued that law reform should be effectuated at the

" Camden

Coalition v. Nardi, Civ. No. 1128-70 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 19, 1970).
sThe plaintiffs, civil rights and community groups and several representatives
f1,6 t, C....de.
of a class of poor people, filed a iispendens which made it i.pssii
Housing Authority to pass a grant title to the builders. See Note, supra note 44, at 254
n.77.
59 Id. at 254-55 n.77. Fred Speaker, Director of the Office of Legal Services, had investigated the suit and found everything in order. Id. at 255 n.77.
60 ld. (quoting from Transcript of Meeting in Vice President Agnew's Office,
Feb. 1, 1972). The Vice President indicated later that he felt that agencies which require public funding should not attack a governmental agency for decisions which involve the judgments of public officials. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 4; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1972, § 4, at 3, col. 4.
61 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
62 Agnew, What's Wrong with the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 930, 930
(1972). Responding to the Vice President's charge that the program was creating
"ideological vigilantes," whose interests were only in changing the system, not helping the individual client, id. at 931, one commentator pointed out that the vast majority of Legal Services cases were either settled or litigated in a traditional manner.
Klaus, Legal Services Program Reply to Vice President Agnew, 58 A.B.A.J. 1178, 1179
(1972). See also Falk & Pollak, What's Wrong with Attacks on the Legal Services Program, 58 A.B.A.J. 1287 (1972).
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national or regional level, not by the local attorney. In addition, he
argued that the off-duty political activities of the individual poverty
lawyer should be strictly regulated and that controls be placed on
group representation and attempts at the solicitation of clients.
Finally, he felt that these lawyers should be "supervised by the bar
• . . and held to a very high standard of conduct. " ' 63 In part, these restrictions were incorporated into the Legal Services Corporation Act

which was signed into law in

1974.64

Although the Vice President's attacks were demoralizing, none
were nearly as lethal as the actions of Howard Phillips, named acting
director of OEO in January 1973 and given the goal of dismantling the
Office of Economic Opportunity. 65 Within days after his appointment, Phillips fired the acting national Legal Services director and a
number of regional office staff, abolished the long-standing National
Advisory Commission to Legal Services, authorized month-to-month
finding of programs, and denounced the policy of law reform. 6 6
Phillips opposed the expenditure of federal funds " 'to pay people
unaccountable to elected officials to decide what is good and what
is bad public policy on behalf of the poor.' "67
Fortunately for the continued health of Legal Services, a number of senators successfully sued to oust Phillips from his position as
acting director, contending that he was serving illegally because his
68
name had not been submitted to the Senate for confirmation.
Previous congressional appropriations funded the program until the
Legal Services Corporation became operative. 69
From the 1967 Murphy amendments, through the attacks on
Legal Services by Agnew and Phillips, the critics continually pushed
for the increased accountability of the Legal Services programs to
local elected officials. However, what all have failed to recognize or
63 Agnew, supra note 62, at 932.

'4See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996e-f (Supp. IV, 1975).
65 See Note, supra note 12, at 966.
,6 See

Arnold, The

Knockdowcn,

Drag-out Battle

Ocer

Legal

Seruices, JURIS

DOCTOR, Apr. 1973, at 4. 4-6; Note, supra note 12, at 966. Phillips' moves caused

general panic in the local projects, and the temporary closing of some major projects.
67 Arnold, supra note 66, at 6. A founder of Young Americans for Freedom, Phillips
was ideologically and politically bound to the Nixon Administration. Id. at 8-9.
68 Williams v. Phillips, 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C.), motion for stay denied, 482
F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1973). A union of OEO employees was also successful in obtaining an injunction against any dissolution of the agency prior to the legal (late on which
it was set to expire. Local 2677, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp.
60, 83 (D.D.C. 1973).
69 See Note, supra note 12, at 967.
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accept is that an attorney's ethical responsibility to his or her client
is-and must be-severable from the question of how legal services
are to be funded. 70 It was a recognition of this need for professional
and fiscal severability which led to the creation of a totally separate
program.
The Legal Services Corporation
In May 1971, President Nixon, following the recommendation of
the Ash Council on Executive Reorganization, proposed that the en71
tire Legal Services Program be severed from the executive branch.
The Administration introduced legislation providing for a nonprofit
corporation to take over the Legal Services Program. A bill was
passed by both houses of Congress, 72 but was vetoed by President
Nixon on December 9, 1971, because he was opposed to certain re-

7'The

new ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-23, instructs:
Since a lawyer must always be free to exercise his professional judgment without regard to the interests or motives of a third person, the lawyer who is employed by one to represent another must constantly guard against erosion of
his professional freedom.
(Footnote omitted.)
There has been extensive discussion of the possible effects that a federally funded
program might have on the ethical responsibilities owed by lawyers to their clients.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 973-77; Note, supra note 6, at 836-39; Note, Ethical
Problems Raised byj the Neighborhood Law Office, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 916 (1966).

However, the new Code seems to have alleviated many of the more serious problems. See Note, supra note 12, at 973-77.
7i This action was prompted more by political than social considerations. By removing Legal Services from the executive branch, politically unsafe litigation could
be pursued without reflecting on the Nixon Administration. See Note, supra note 12,
At 982 & n.115.

The possibility of independence from the executive was appealing to the organized
bar, as well. One commentator has summarized the reasons for the organized bar's support of an independent corporation:
(1) The Governor's veto, provided for in the Economic Opportunity Act, was
being used against local projects;
(2) The requirement of a 20 percent local share led some cities or community
leaders to cut off the share in an attempt to close down successful legal service offices;
(3) Each time the Economic Opportunity Act came up for a two year renewal
the Legal Services Program was endangered by amendments;
(4) In 1970 the Senate Finance Committee wrote into the amendments to the
Social Security Act a provision prohibiting litigation against government
agencies. The amendment was dropped in conference, but nevertheless
symbolized another statutory threat to the LSP;
(5) An independent corporation would ensure the legitimacy of separate
budget requests, and perhaps higher amounts would then be allocated by
Congress.
Pious, supra note 11, at 439 (footnote omitted).
72 S. 1305, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 6361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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strictions placed on him as to the selection of directors of the Corporation. 73 The vetoed measure would have permitted the President to
appoint his own choices to only five out of nineteen directorship
posts; the remaining fourteen positions would have been filled from
lists provided by various professionals and groups. 7 4 The bill was
in conredrafted in 1972 at the urging of the President, but it died
75
ference committee when no compromise could be reached.
Finally, on May 11, 1973, with the mandated date for the dissolution of OEO rapidly approaching, the President again called for
passage of an Administration-sponsored bill establishing the Legal
76
Services Corporation as an independent, nonprofit organization.
With Howard Phillips' exit from OEO in September 1973, the main
concern of Legal Services supporters became the contest in Congress over the final shape of the bill. Supporters in both houses were
frankly fatigued with the issue of Legal Services and pressed both
sides for a resolution of differences between the Administration and
the Legal Services community. The White House, increasingly directing its attention to the unfolding Watergate crisis, vacillated between an acceptance of a reasonable bill advocated by moderate
White House aides such as Leonard Garment and catering to the
stringent pro-veto voices of a more conservative element whose support might be needed in an impeachment fight.
As the bill neared passage in July 1974, the battle claimed one
more victim. Alvin J. Arnett, Howard Phillips' successor, was asked
to submit his resignation to the President on July 16th. He agreed
to resign rather than precipitate another controversy only after assurances from the White House that the President would sign the
Legal Services Corporation bill into law. 77
On July 25, 1974, without ceremony, President Nixon signed the
7 President Nixon

viewed these

restrictions

as "an

affront to the

principle of

accountability to the American people as a whole," and he insisted that "a free hand"
be given to the President in the appointment of the directors inasmuch as the Chief
Executis c is "the one official accountable to, and answerable to, the whole American
people.'" The President's Mlessage to the Senate Returning S. 2007 Without His Ap7 PRES. Doc. 1634, 1635 (1971).
procl,
74 S. 1305, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 904(a) (1971); H.R. 6361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

§ 904(a) (1971).
- See H.R. REP. No. 92-1367. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1972). It is probable that
neither version of the 1972 hill would have been signed by the President, as neither incorporated changes regarded by Mr. Nixon as necessary in the area of Presidential appointment of directors. See Note, supra note 12, at 983-84.
76 See Statement bh/ the President Upon Transmitting to the Congress Proposed
Legislation to Establish the Corporation, 9 PRES. Doc. 664 (1973).

77Washington Post, July 16, 1974, at Al, col. 1.
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Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, in San Clemente, California,
one of the last official acts of his presidency. 78 The law itself was
satisfactory to few on either side of the long debate, but for good or
ill it institutionalizes a national commitment to free civil legal services
for the poor.
The Legal Services Corporation Act of 197479 was a response by
Congress to its perception that "to preserve its strength, the legal
services program must be kept free from the influence of or use by

it of political pressure. '- 80 While President Nixon had first called for
the depoliticization of Legal Services on May 5, 1971,81 he vetoed
the resulting legislation for what is clearly a political reason: the failure of the bill to permit the chief executive to name a sufficient number of directors in accordance with his own prerogatives. 8 2 The 1974
enactment seeks to meet the need for political insulation by establishing the Legal Services Corporation as "a private nonmembership nonprofit corporation- 8 3 with a board of directors 84 empowered
to make financial grants, engage in research activities, and discipline
grant recipients who fail to comply with provisions of the Act. 85 Congress attempted to keep effective control of the Corporation from any
one political party. The board of directors is comprised of eleven
members of whom no more than six may be of the same political party.
The President is empowered to name the directors with the advice
N.Y. Times, July 26, 1975, at 34, col. 7.
Act of july 25, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996 et se(. (Sopp. IV, 1975)).
80 42 U.S.C. § 2996(5) (Supp. IV, 1975). Congress also recognized the "need to provide equal access to [our] system of justice," noting that making legal seivices available to the poor has in many instances "'reaffirmed [their] faith in our government of
laws." Id. §§ 2996(1), (4).
81 See The President's Message to the Congress Proposing Establishment of the
Independent Corporation, 7 PRES. Doc. 726, 727 (1971). President Nixon, after enumerating his suggestions for the procedures to be used in appointing directors of
the corporation, stated that these recommendations were "all painstakingly designed
to insulate the board from outside pressures." Id. at 728.
82 See The President's Message to the Senate Returning S. 2007 Without His Approval, 7 PRES. Doc. 1634 (1971). In this veto message, President Nixon reiterated
that the interest of the administration in proposing the Legal Services Corporation
legislation was to "create a . . . Corporation, truly independent of political influences." Id. at 1635. It is difficult to square this statement with the reason announced
for the veto.
83 42 U.S.C. § 29961(a) (Supp. IV, 1975). For a discussion of other federally funded
nonprofit corporations, notably the Corporation for Public Broadcasting which served
as a model for the Legal Services Corporation see ABA, THE CORPORATION FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUD, 33-41 (1971).
84 42 U.S.C. § 2996c (Stipp. IV, 1975).
85 Id.§§ 2996e(a), (b).
78

79
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and consent of the Senate but is limited as to his own choices. No director may be a full-time employee of the United States. 86 Nor may
the selection, appointment, promotion, or any other action relating
to Corporation personnel, or the appointment or supervision of fund
recipients, be based upon any political consideration. 8 7
This process of depoliticization extends to the activities of the
Corporation as a whole, and to the individual Legal Services attorneys. Corporation funds, whether used by a grantee or the Corporation itself, may not be expended to support any political party or
candidate. 88 Nor may such funds be used in either support or opposition to "any ballot measures, initiatives, or referendums." 89 Apart
from financial expenditure to achieve these purposes, the Corporation itself may not "undertake to influence the passage or defeat of
any legislation by the Congress of the United States or by any State
or local legislative bodies." 90 The political restrictions imposed on
the individual Legal Services attorneys are even more marked. The
attorney who is "engaged in legal assistance activities supported in
whole or in part by the Corporation" is not permitted "while so engaged" to take part in "any political activity," 9 1 transporting voters
93
to or from the polls, 9 2 or engage in "any voter registration activity."
While acknowledging the need for legal services and the importance of limiting partisan influences, Congress has diminished
the significance of the Act by placing a number of restrictions on the
Corporation. Funds may not be expended in the support or conduct of
training programs designed for the advocacy of a specific public policy or for strikes, boycotts, or demonstrations. 9 4 Exempted from
this restriction are programs for training attorneys and paralegals to
assist eligible clients, and the mere dissemination of information concerning political activities. 95 The Act forbids the Corporation from
" Id. §

2996c(a).
Id. § 2996d(b)(2).
88 Id. § 2996e(d)(3).
89 Id. § 2996e(d)(4).

87

90 Id. § 2996e(c)(2).
9' Id. § 2996f(a)(6)(A)
92 Id. § 2996f(a)(6)(B).

3 Id. § 2996f(a)(6)(C).
In addition to these political and quasi-political restrictions, the Act provides that
if it is found that an action has been "commenced or pursued for the sole purpose of
harassment of the defendant" or that the Legal Services plaintiff has "maliciously
abused legal process," the Corporation is required to pay all reasonable costs and legal fees of the defendant. Id. § 2996e(f).
94 Id. § 2996f(b)(5).
95

Id.
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making grants or entering into contracts with any private law firm
which spends fifty percent or more of its time or resources dealing
with "issues in the broad interests of a majority of the public, " 96 thus
eliminating the usefil back-up centers. Corporation funds may not be
spent for school desegregation, 97 nontherapeutic abortion, 9 8 or selective service, desertion, or amnesty litigation. 99 Additionally, the institution of class actions and participation as amici curiae by Legal
Services attorneys are restricted. 10 0 Furthermore, the local projects
must solicit from and give preference to members of the local bar
when hiring new attorneys. 101
Despite these restrictions and the questionable limitations on
the personal political activities of individual attorneys, the very
establishment of the Corporation is the most positive aspect of the
Act. It is hoped that the Corporation will be able to protect the poverty law program from the political attacks which have consistently
threatened its stability.
Further political problems, however, hindered the final implementation of the Corporation. Although the Act was passed in July
of 1974, it was not until October of 1975 that the Corporation became operational. 10 2 The list of eleven proposed directors for the
board which was floated by the Ford Administration in December
1974 was greeted with opposition from the Legal Services community
and the organized bar. The majority of the designees had neither
knowledge of nor experience in Legal Services. Two had been strong
critics of the concept of federally funded programs in the past. And
the primary qualifications of the person first nominated as Chairman
of the Board were his conservative Republican credentials as Barry
Goldwater's former campaign manager.i ° 3 The lobbying activities of
the bar associations throughout an entire year led finally to the withdrawal of the objectionable nominees, and the appointment of a new,
10 4
more acceptable board.
9 Id. § 2996f(b)(3).
97 Id. § 2996f(b)(7).

911
1d. § 2996f(b)(8).
99 Id. § 2996f(b)(9).
100 Id. § 2996e(d)(5).
101 Id. § 2996f(a)(8).

Arnold, supra note 21, at 32.
President Ford's designees included one former (ongresswonan,
Edith Green,
who had successfully worked to eliminate back-up centers from the 1973 bill,
and
William L. Knecht, a Republican, who had been Governor Reagan's prosecutor of California Rural Legal Assistance. Id. at 34-35.
104 See id. at 34-38. Roger C. Cramton, Dean of Cornell University
Law School,
ultimately became the first Chairman of the Board. Among the other directors are an102

103
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In the interim between the signing of the bill and the completion of the confirmation process, the Office of Economic Opportunity
passed out of existence. The recently created Community Services
Administration operated as a caretaker for the Legal Services programs, until they passed fully into the national Corporation in October
of 1975.105 In the meantime the board met frequently and actively.
At its first meeting it unanimously submitted a request to increase
annual funding to $96.6 million. 106 The board's initial activities appear
to reflect a professional, competent, and non-ideological approach to
maintaining and improving the quality of legal services for the nation's
poor. The long era of political battling has hopefully come to an end.
ACCESS TO THE COURTS: REFORM FOR THE FUTURE

While the establishment of the Corporation is, on balance, a
positive step, and the efforts of Legal Services attorneys have significantly changed the law in many areas affecting the poor, several areas
remain in which reforms must be effected.
Although a majority of the nation's citizens have access to free
counsel in civil matters as a result of the federally funded Legal Services programs, no constitutional right to counsel in all civil matters
has yet been recognized. 10 7 The right to counsel in criminal matters
10 8
was established by the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Waintright.
Legal Services attorneys have made significant contributions in extending the right to counsel to persons facing possible imprisonment
for misdemeanor violations in Argersinger v. Hamlin' °9 and to juveother law school administrator, a professor, a former state attorney general, a former
judge, and the president of NLADA. Id. at 36.
105 Id.
at 33. For discussion of the problems and opportunities which face the new
corporation see Klaus, Civil Legal Services for the Poor, in AMERICAN ASSEMBLY,
LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 131 (M. Schwartz ed. 1976); Cramton, The Task
Ahead in Legal Services, 61 A.B.A.J. 1339 (1975).
106 Arnold, supra note 21, at 32.
107 For a general discussion of the right to counsel see Note, The Indigent's Right
to Counsel in Cicil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967). While the various issues involved in
"access to the courts" are analyzed in terms of the federal constitution in this article,
the same questions may be explored under state constitutions. This is an area of potential importance in light of the increasing conservatism of the United States Supreme
Court and an emerging willingness of state courts to make expansive interpretations of
state constitutional rights. See generally Note, Toward an Activist Role for State Bills
of Rights, 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 271 (1973).
108 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). For discussion of the development of a right to counsel in criminal matters see Seidelson, The Right to Counsel: From Passive to Active

Voice, 38

GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849 (1970).
109 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). The Court held

that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may he imprisoned
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nile offenders in In re Gault.1 10 But that right must be extended to
guarantee to indigent citizens the assistance of counsel in all matters
in which the interests of life, liberty, or property are at stake.' 1 Many
civil proceedings have consequences for the poor which are as serious
as criminal proceedings."12 Certainly, a poor tenant facing an illegal
eviction who has no money to pay for a security deposit on another
apartment, or a welfare mother of six whose welfare grants have been
mysteriously cut off, must be represented by counsel in some capacity to defend these vital interests properly and to assure a meaningful
opportunity to redress their grievances.

1 13

Is it not of fundamental in-

terest to the individuals involved and society in general to prevent
homelessness and malnutrition and the break-up of families? The
courts and legislatures must recognize the importance of providing
4
counsel to help protect these important interests."
Although there is no right to counsel in divorce proceedings,
the Supreme Court established the right to a waiver of court filing
fees in a divorce action in Boddie v. Connecticut,"15 a case brought
by Legal Services attorneys. The Court based its holding on the
fundamental nature of the marriage relationship and the fact that the
state had complete control over the creation and dissolution of marriages. Given these two considerations, a financial barrier to access
to the courts was deemed a violation of due process. 1 16 However, in
two subsequent cases, the Court failed to pursue the approach enunfor any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless
he was represented by counsel at his trial.
Id. (footnote omitted).
110 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
"I Many commentators have argued for representation in specific kinds of cases.
See, e.g., Chotiner, Parole Revocation Hearings: The Need for Right to Counsel, 4 U.
SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 23 (1975); Comment, A Child's Right to Independent

Counsel in Custody Proceedings: Providing Effective "Best Interests" Determination Through the Use of a Legal Advocate, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 303 (1975); Comment,
A Constitutional Right to Court Appointed Counsel for the Involuntarily Committed
Mentally Ill: Beyond the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 64 (1973).
112Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901 & n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
113Other seriously traumatic events might include the garnishment of wages, divorce, and the loss of custody of a child.
114 One commentator noted in 1967 that eleven states had enacted legislation providing for the appointment of counsel for indigents in civil cases, but that the statutes
were rarely used. Many states limited the appointment of counsel to specific cases.
For example, New Jersey provided such counsel only in matrimonial matters. See
Silverstein, Payment of Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil
Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 21, 49-50 (1967).

115 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971). See generally LaFrance, Constitutional Law Refori for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE L.J. 487.
116 401 U.S. at 374.
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ciated in Boddie. In United States v. Kras, 1 17 despite the cogent
argument of the respondents that a discharge in bankruptcy involved
constitutionally protected rights, the Court refused to invalidate a
provision requiring the payment of filing fees before obtaining a
discharge in bankruptcy. 1 18 And, in Ortwein v. Schwab, 119 the Court
ranged even firther afield from the sensitivity to the effects of poverty evinced in Boddie. The petitioners in Ortwein had been denied
the right to appeal a welfare agency determination which had reduced their grants when they were unable to pay the $25.00 appellate
court filing fee. 120 The Court did not view this as an unconstitutional barrier, emphasizing that the relationship sought to be protected in Boddie was more significant than the loss of welfare

benefits. 121
Despite the Court's refusal to recognize the fundamental nature
of the rights involved in bankruptcy and in the loss of welfare benefits, 1 22 many states have statutory provisions for the waiver of court
fees for indigent litigants, including all clients of Legal Services
programs. 123 But there are many jurisdictions in which such fees are
not waived. It is of vital importance that the Supreme Court finally
recognize the right to the waiver of such fees in all civil cases. 124
17

409 U.S. 434 (1973).
at 443-46. The Court felt that no ftundamental

118 Id.

interest was involved and

that the federal courts did not hold the exclusive remedy for a debtor because he could
always adjust his debts by negotiated agreement with his creditors. Id. at 445.
119 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
120 Id. at 656-57.
121 Id. at 659.
122 For discussion and analysis of Boddie, Kras, and Ortwein see \Iichelnan, The
Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect One's Rights (pt. 1),
1973 DUKE L.J. 1153; Comment, The Right of Access to Cicil Courts by Indigents: A
Prognosis, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 129, 135-46 (1974); Comment, The Heirs of Boddie: Court
Access for Indigents After Kras and Ortwein, 8 HARV. Cix. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV.
571 (1973).
12 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 33, § 5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975-76); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 22A:1-7 (1969): WIS. STAT. ANN. § 271.29 (Supp. 1975-76).
124 The possible avenues of approach to establishing a constitutional right to unhindered access to the courts include due process, equal protection and first amendment arguments. See Michelnan, The Supreme Court arid Litigation Access Fees: The
Right to Protect One's Rights (pt. 2), 1974 DUKE L.J. 527. Professor -,ichelman conclides
his analysis with a two-pronged argument in support of a constitutional right to free
access:
[F]irst, there is a doctrine opposed to governmentally imposed fees which
have the effect of excluding inligent persons from the enjoyment of constitutionally favored interests; second, persons
o have a constitutionally
avired interest in a standing opportunity to avail themselves of' whatever
juridical processes are normally available to members of the coim innits.
Id. at 567 (footnote oinitted). See also Hisey, Right to Counsel in Civil Matters, 31

1976]

LEGAL SERVICES

Even indigent litigants whose filing fees are waived by the state
and who are represented by a Legal Services attorney, however, face
further access problems because they cannot afford to pay for such
"luxuries" as expert testimony at trial or transcripts at the appellate
level.1 2 5 Because the Legal Services programs do not have sufficient
funds to underwrite these costs, 12 6 the result is that the poor are
often forced to press their claims without sufficient testimony or to
accept an adverse decision without a possibility of appeal.
New Jersey is an example of a state which has been trying to
come to grips with the problem, with the significant prodding and
help from the Legal Services projects. It has been in the vanguard
of states providing indigent litigants accessibility to the legal system. 12 7 One of the most significant measures taken by New Jersey
in this regard is the waiver of court filing fees at both the trial and
appellate levels, upon the court's acceptance of the indigent's "verified application" of his lack of funds. 12 8 This application is waived if
29
the party is represented by a legal aid or legal services program.'
A notice of the availability of legal services is now included on all
summonses from lower courts,' 30 and third-year law students and
NLADA BRIEFCASE 302, 303-06 (1972); Comment, The Right of Access to Civil Courts
by Indigents: A Prognosis, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 129, 146-54 (1974); Note, A First Amendment Right ofAccess to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973).
125 Another expense which generally must be borne by the litigant is that of divorce publication fees. See Wife L. v. Husband L., 305 A.2d 620, 622 (Del. 1973).
However, the practice of publication is "archaic" and will probably soon be eliminated.
See id. Going hbeyond the question of filing fees, the Court in Boddie stated:
[W]e think that reliable alternatives exist to service of process by a state-paid
sheriff if the State is unwilling to assume the cost of official service. This is
perforce true of service by publication which is the method of notice least
calculated to bring to a potential defendant's attention the pendency of judicial proceedings. . . . We think in this case service at defendant's last known
address by mail and posted notice is equally effective as publication in a
newspaper.
401 U.S. at 382 (citation omitted).
For an exhaustive study of the in forma pauperis provisions of' the various states
and the litigation costs in the major cities see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, PUBLIC
PROVISION FOR COSTS AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL LITIGATION, App. A, at 53-68 (1966);
id. App. C, at 80-100.
i26 Each program is budgeted a certain amount for appellate expenses, but often
the project may spend its whole annual budget on one or two appeals and a few expert
witnesses. Also, because of the fixed nature of the grants, projects have been forced
to invade these funds in order to keep or attract good attorneys and staff with reasonable salaries, or to cover some other area which has suffered from inflation.
127 See generally Bianchi, Effects of Progressive Court Administration in Legal
Services and the Poor in New Jersey, 55 JUDICATURE 227 (1972).
128 N.J.R. 1:13-2(a). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 22A:1-7 (1969).
'29

N.J.R. 1:13-2(a).

130

See Bianchi, supra note 127, at 229.
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recent law-school graduates, if part of an approved program, are
permitted to represent indigents in the lower courts.'31
The expense of expert witnesses constitutes a significant barrier for litigants in New Jersey. The payment of fees for such witnesses is, for the most part, the responsibility of the litigant, except
in negligence or wrongful death actions where the court may order
and pay the fees of an impartial witness if necessary. 132 This provision does not benefit Legal Services clients, however, because it
generally applies to fee-generating cases which the projects are specifically precluded from handling. 133 Despite the lack of explicit
statutory or constitutional authority to do so, there appears to be a
discernible effort on the part of the New Jersey courts to make expert testimony available to the poor in exceptional cases. In In re
Gannon,'3 4 for example, the Somerset County Court held that in an
involuntary commitment proceeding, due process entitled the patient to both counsel appointed by the court 135 and to the services
of "an independent psychiatrist . .. to be designated by the court
36
and paid by the county."l
The payment of expert witness fees can be prohibitive even for
the state, but in cases involving findamental rights, in which the
testimony of experts is the most important evidence considered, the
131 N.J.R.
1:21-3(c). Another provision which is of particular importance to Legal
Services is N.J.R. 1:21-3(d), which permits out-of-state attorneys to practice law in
New Jersey for up to two and a half years if employed by a Legal Services program.
132 N.J.R. 4:20. The rule provides for the establishment by the Administrative
Director of the Courts of an impartial panel of experts with the assistance of the Medical Society of New Jersey. N.J.R. 4:20-2. Compensation for the services of these experts is to come "out of funds appropriated for the operation of the State courts."
N.J.R. 4:20-11.
133 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1975).
134 123 N.J. Super. 104, 301 A.2d 493 (Somerset County Ct. 1973). The patient had
voluntarily entered a Veterans Administration Hospital. Thereafter he expressed a
desire to be released, but permission was denied by the hospital staff. Id. at 105, 301
A.2d at 493. Statutory commitment proceedings were begun. The court held that, although counsel had been provided for Gannon, this alone would not protect his rights
to due process of law. Because of the varying possible diagnoses of mental illness, the
court determined that the patient has the right to an examination by an impartial psychiatrist who could effectively represent him at the commitment hearing and possibly rebut the testimony of the psychiatrist employed by the state. See id. at 105-06,
301 A.2d at 493-94.
135 Id. at 105, 301 A.2d at 494.
136Id. at 107, 301 A.2d at 494. The court found that the commitment statute which
allowed the court to have transcripts made of the proceedings at the court's expense
"impliedly authorizes the appointment of an independent psychiatrist." Id. at 106,
301 A.2d at 494. The court, however, did not go so far as to allow Gannon "to 'shop
around' for a psychiatrist who agrees with him." Id. This limitation is unfortunate,
for the rich are probably in a position to find an expert to support exactly their position.
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failure of the state to pay for a witness effectively precludes an indigent from presenting any case at all.' 3 7 Therefore, it is important
that legislation be passed which would provide for the direct payment of reasonable fees to a witness of the litigant's choice, or the
furnishing of impartial witnesses by the state.' 38 The litigant should
only be required to show indigency and a reasonable need for such
expert testimony.
Another area in which serious financial barriers exist is the fees
charged by court reporters for depositions or trial transcripts. 139 The
constitutional right of a criminal defendant to obtain a transcript
for purposes of appeal was established by the United States Supreme
Court in Griffin v. Illinois. 140 The Court recognized that, because
of the state's requirement that a transcript of the lower court proceeding be furnished to the reviewing court on appeal, an appellant
who could not afford to pay for the transcript was effectively precluded from pressing an appeal. Such a barrier was viewed as viola41
tive of equal protection and due process of law. 1
In criminal actions, the findarnental interest at stake compels
recognition of a constitutional right to a transcript as well as counsel.
The courts have had some difficulty in applying the Griffin rationale
to civil cases in which no fundamental interest is involved. In Lee v.
Habib, 1 42 a landlord-tenant case, the District of Columbia court of
appeals cogently outlined the constitutional right to a transcript in

137 One commentator, noting the decided advantage to be gained by the use of a
blood test in defending a paternity suit, has pointed out that in some jurisdictions
the laboratory fees are prohibitive. Wiiiging, Financial Buiiers and thc Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J. 253, 278-79 (1968). He also noted the need for expert testimony in an action brought by a tenant for a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability to appraise the rental value, the market value, and the estimated value of
the damages to the tenant. Id. at 279.
13 Although it may be unrealistic to ask "experts" of the various professions and
trades to appear without compensation, they should be urged through their representative organizations to ask lower fees of indigents. A panel of experts might be assembled by these organizations to provide testimony and advice for indigent litigants.
Additionally, students of the various professional schools throughout the state, though
perhaps not qualified to testify at trial, might assist in the evaluation and preparation
of indigents' law suits.
139 Depositions are excluded as a matter of course because they are too expensive.
The Legal Services programs lack the funding to allow the poor to avail themselves of
the right to employ depositions in their discovery processes. As a result, their claims
cannot be pursued as completely as necessary. See \Villging, su pra note 137, at 278.
140351 U.S. 12 (1956).
141 Id. at 18. See also Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967) (an indigent
criminal defendant has a right to a free transcript of a preliminary hearing).
142 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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civil cases. Starting with Griffin, the court traced the development
of equal protection principles into the civil area 1 43 and concluded:
The equal protection clause applies to both civil and criminal
cases; the Constitution protects life, liberty and property. It is the
importance of the right to the individual, not the technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance
to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case ...
The right of all to have free access to the courts is basic to
our democratic system. It . . . cannot be conditioned on the pay-

ment of a fee where such a condition precludes the exercise of the
right. 144

Although the decision in Lee is based on statutory authority to
order a free transcript, 145 it is one of the few cases to approach this
question so progressively. Nevertheless, the production of a trial
146
transcript is almost universally required for appellate review.
Thus, an indigent who cannot pay the high costs of transcribing the
lower court proceedings is effectively precluded from bringing an
appeal.
The New Jersey supreme court, currently considering the issue
14 7
of a right to a transcript in In re Guardianship of Felicia Dotson,'
has an opportunity to implement the principles discussed in Lee.
The case involves an appeal from a guardianship proceeding in which
the defendant mother was represented by Legal Services.' 48 The trial
judge granted the defendant's request for a free transcript at state
49
expense because of the fundamental nature of the rights involved.'
143Id. at 898-901.

144 Id. at 901 (footnote omitted).
145 Id. at 903-04.

146 See, e.g., N.J.R. 2:5-3(a), which instructs that a request for a transcript be made
at the same time as the filing of the notice of appeal. At the time this request is made,
the appellant must also pay a deposit amounting to "either the estimated cost of the
transcript or the sum of $200.00 for each day or fraction thereof of trial or hearing."
N.J.R. 2:5-3(d).
147 No. A-1403-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Apr. 25, 1975), cert. granted, 68 N.J.
171, 343 A.2d 459 (1975).
148 The appellant had lost custody of her four children in Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court to the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services. No. A-140374, at 1 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Apr. 25, 1975).
149 In re Guardianship of F. D., No. 523, at 5 (N.J., Somerset County Juv. & Dor.
Rel. Ct., Jan. 18, 1974). The court determined:
The permanent termination of parental rights is one of the most drastic actions the State can take against its citizens. To permit it to be done in the fact
[sic] of alleged error by the simple expedient of refusing an indigent appellant a
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The appellate division affirmed and the supreme court subsequently
granted certification. 150 An indigent's constitutional right to a transcript has already been recognized in New Jersey when the fundamental interest of liberty in an involuntary civil commitment proceeding was present. Relying upon the access principles enunciated
in Griffin and Boddie, the trial court in In re Minehan' 5' held that
both due process and equal protection required the furnishing of a
transcript at "public expense." 5 2 The interest in a continuing familial
relationship is at least as fundamental a concern as the question of a
civil commitment.
In cases not involving a fundamental interest such as that presented in Dotson, the legislature must provide finds for the provision of transcripts to indigents in all civil appeals. The right to one
appeal, otherwise constitutionally guaranteed in New Jersey, 153 is
seriously curtailed by the prohibitive cost of obtaining a transcript.
Although filing fees are waived by court rule for persons represented
by a Legal Services program, transcripts in New Jersey appear to
be the property of the court reporterl5 4 and, as such, may not be
covered by the fee-waiver provision. Thus, without any specific grant
of authority, an order by the court to provide a transcript would
seem to amount to a "legislative appropriation"' 1 5 that might not
transcript would be unconscionable.
id. at 4.
The appellate division in Dotson did not address itself to the constitutional issues,
but held that because the state had initiated the action,
[i]t is not an unreasonable exercise of judicial discretion to require that the

State bear the cost of perfecting its claim through the appellate stages of the
proceedings where the trialcourt . . . determines that a fill transcript is oet-es-

sary f'br the appeal.
No. A-1403-74, at 2 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Apr. 25, 1975).
1) No. A-1403-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div., Apr. 25, 1975), cert. granted, 68 N.J.
459, 343 A.2d 459 (1975).
151 130 N.J. Super. 298, 301-03, 326 A.2d 118, 120-21 (Union County Ct. 1974).
152 Id. at 303-04, 326 A.2d at 121.
153 N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 5,
2. See also Midler v. Heinowitz, 10 N.J. 123, 129, 89
A.2d 458, 461 (1952).
154N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 11- 16(f) (Supp. 1975-76) provides:
Every reporter shall he entitled to retain for himself the fees collected for transcripts as herein provided. All transcript supplies and equipment shall be furnished by the reporter at his own expense.
155 Bianchi, supra note 127, at 231. The applicable statute refers to the waiver of
payment of any fees to any court or clerk thereof" for indigents. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 22A:1-7 (1969). The applicable rule provides for the waiver of "the payment of any
fees provided for by law which are payable to any court or clerk of court or any public

officer of this State." N.J.R. 1:13-2(a). No mention is made of' waiver of transcript fees.
But the statute does discuss fees paid to the court clerk, and the fees of the court reporter are so paid. Arguably, because the costs of a transcript are paid to the court clerk,
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yield to the demands of due process and equal protection. Only if
the legislature appropriates funds to the Administrative Office of the
Courts to be disbursed to the individual court reporter upon order
of the trial judge or to be given directly to the court reporter by an appropriate state agency, will there be a sufficient source of funds available to subsidize this necessary expense. Until the legislature appropriates the funds necessary to provide free transcripts in all cases,
the courts might welcome and encourage the use of the present rule
which permits the submission of an abbreviated transcript. 15 6 Many
hearings, particularly in landlord-tenant actions, are quite short, so
that the possibility for disagreement of counsel as to relevant portions
of the transcript is significantly lessened. Parties should be admonished to consent to the use of the abbreviated transcript unless
they can maintain an argument that the full transcript must be presented.
Although only a few of many viable alternatives have been suggested, it is incumbent upon the courts and the legislature to further
explore this area of access to the courts. Only an elimination of these
financial barriers will truly open our judicial system to all citizens of
this nation.
THE NEW JERSEY EXPERIENCE:
IMPACT ON LANDLORD-TENANT REFORM

New Jersey has learned through painful experience the consequences of the alienation of the poor from established government.
On April 29, 1967, the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey
warned of the "increased isolation of millions of Americans and the
concomitant frustrations which tend to generate ominous threats to
they are included in the waiver provision, although the original order is placed with
the reporter.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 22A:2-3 (1969) permits the supreme court by general or specific
rule to "order . . . the payment of the cost of the transcript . . . as the court may deem

just," but no such rule has been promulgated. While no such rule exists, it is clearly
the intent of the legislature that if the court deemed it necessary, it would be entirely
appropriate to promulgate a rule providing for free trial transcripts.
156N.J.R. 2:5-3(c) provides:
The transcript may be abbreviated only in civil actions and under R. 3:23-3,
either:
(1) by consent, provided all parties to the appeal agree in writing that
only a stated portion thereof will be needed by the appellate court, and in
such cases, only those portions of the transcript specified in the writing shall
be ordered in the request for transcript, or
(2) by order of the trial judge or agency which determined the matter on
appellant's motion specifying the points on which he will rely on the appeal....
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the stability of the rule of law.' 1 5 7 Seventy-seven days later, the city
of Newark erupted into massive violence which resulted in the death
of twenty-three persons and property damage exceeding ten million
dollars. Throughout that summer, one of the few tenuous links between the governmental establishment and the poor and black cornmunities was the fledgling local Legal Services program. Newark
Legal Services Project estimated that it had handled over 1300 cases
in connection with the disturbances. 158
The speed and willingness with which Legal Services and volunteer attorneys responded to this emergency was indicative of the
history of general responsiveness on the part of the bar in New Jersey
to the concept of legal assistance to the poor. The movement to expand legal aid in New Jersey was spurred in the 1950's by the enthusiasm of Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt of the state supreme
court. 15 9 As a result, New Jersey became one of the first states to attempt to make legal assistance available to nearly all of its indigent
citizens. 160 With this already relatively well established network, the
OEO programs were implemented quite rapidly with the enthusiastic
support of the state. 161 There are presently 32 Legal Services offices
157 Address by Attorney General Arthur J. Sills Before a Law Student Conference
on Legal Service to the Poor, Sponsored by the Seton Hall University School of Law
and the American Law Student Association, April 29, 1967 (reprinted in LEGAL REPRE-

SENTATION OF THE POOR xxxvii (E. Jarmel ed. 1968)).
158 NEWARK LEGAL SERVICES PROJECT, NEWARK'S POOR AND THE LAW 11-12 (1968).

The project was considered in the late sixties to be one of the best in the country. See
OEO, Evaluation Reports: Newark Legal Services Project and Newark-Essex Law Reform 1-3, Aug. 6, 1971.
159 See Bell, Legal Aid in New jersey: The Answer io a Soci,,z,-if LegalPrOfcs
sion, 36 A.B.A.J. 355-56 (1950). Vanderbilt's enthusiasm was in part due to his fear
of American implementation of the British plan for government-paid legal services.
In an address to the members of the New Jersey bar and participants in legal aid, he
urged:
"Let us set an example to the Bar of the entire country by showing in every
county of the state that we can take care of this whole problem of legal aid
here and now. Let us show the other professions that no matter what others max
do, the Bar intends to remain free and independent."
Id. at 356.
160 See id. at 355; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, REPORT ON LEGAL
AID IN NEW JERSEY 1 (1955). It also had the highest proportion of legal aid offices to

population in the nation. Id. at 7, 10.
161 Although the state had been quite progressive relative to the rest of the nation,
the legal aid societies in existence in New Jersey in 1964 were wholly inadequate to
deal with the vast problems faced by New Jersey's citizens. Many areas had no services and those that did had limited services with severe limitations placed upon litigation. In 1964, the societies serviced 12,485 cases, only 4.6 percent of which were

litigated.

NEW JERSEY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMITTEE ON LAW AND POVERTY,
LAW AND POVERTY: LEGAL SERVICE SYSTEMS FOR NEW JERSEY 8-9 (1966).
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in the state, representing approximately fifty thousand clients annual1y.162 Although each project is autonomous, the State Office of Legal
Services 63 and Legal Services of New Jersey, Inc.,164 have successfully provided opportunities for coordination and collective action in
confronting the many problems of New Jersey's poor.
Prominent among the problems plaguing indigent persons is the
unsatisfied need for adequate housing: "Frustration, eviction and
moving are a constant part of a poor person's life.'

165

In most areas

of the law, the attorneys for poor people were successfid in extending existing law to their clients through the expansion of procedural
safeguards. The cases involving due process rights, application of
welfare regulations, and right to counsel in proceedings in which
incarceration might result all expanded the law but did not restructure substantive rights and remedies. One area in which a major
By 1966, it was clear that the traditional legal aid societies
failed because they have been inadequately financed, administered, staffed,
and coordinated wsith other Agencies better qualified to deal with the poor
in their own environment. Thus, Legal Aid Societies have been too remote
from the poor and have never touched more than the tip of the ice-berg which
freezes the poor to their condition of helplessness.
Id. at 9.
When OEO funds became available, many already existing legal aid societies as
well as bar associations and newly formed projects sought funding. In order to receive such grants, the local project had to raise up to 10% of the grant. The state gave
cash to help many projects, and the waiver of court fees, which served as an in-kind
grant, meant that many projects were over-subscribed in matching fuids.
While emphasis was originally placed on having an individual OEO project in
each county, experience with representation in every count-' showed the inefficiencies
inherent in such decentralization. Many county offices were subsequently merged
into regional offices servicing as many as five counties as is the case for Camden
Regional Legal Services.
162 Letter from Legal Services of New Jersey, Inc. to Seton Hall Laic Review, Feb.
20, 1976, on file at Scion Hall Laic Re'iew.
6' The State Office of Legal Services is part of the Department of Communits
Affairs and is the conduit for the disbursal of state funds to the local projects. It has
served in the past as a general liaison office and back-up center. See Bianchi, supra
note 127, at 227 & n.I. The state office publishes a monthly State Clearinghouse Revicsw which is designed to apprise all New Jeisey Legal Services lawyers of developments in New Jersey law in the hopes of avoiding unnecessarily duplicative law reform work.
164 This organization, which grew out of the New Jersey Legal Services Project
Directors Association, is the spokesgroup for the State programs and open to all attorneys and staff members of the legal services projects. The group has a warm, informal
relationship with the state office and has served as the negotiating party for all of the
local projects with various state funding agencies. It has also developed task forces
to deal with problem areas such as welfare, sexism, and mental health.
165 Bruno, New Jersey Landlord-Tenant Law: Proposals for Reform, 1 RUTGERSCAMDEN L.J. 299, 299 (1969).
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modification was accomplished is landlord-tenant where the legal
system's handling of landlord-tenant relationships has had substantive and procedural ramifications that profoundly affect low-income
tenants. 166 While work was done nationally by Legal Services attorneys committed to remedying the inequities of landlord-tenant
law, 1 67 housing problems were a major concern to New Jersey Legal
Services offices.
In many ways New Jersey has been a microcosm of low-income
housing problems.168 It is one of the most populous states in the
nation, with a substantial percentage of its citizens living in rental
premises. Due to economic conditions, restrictive zoning, and other
factors, there is less than a one percent vacancy rate in the state.
New construction of low-income housing is almost non-existent. Substandard dwellings with fault\' heating devices, leaking toilets, leadbased paint on the walls, and other dilapidated and unhealthy conditions rent for exorbitant prices. In most locales, month-to-month
tenancies are the rule. In many federally subsidized projects, a standard HUD-sanctioned single-month lease is signed, solely protecting
the landlord-usually a local housing authority and is subject to no
negotiation by the tenant.
Although the legal system in New Jersey has become increasingly progressive and responsive to tenant needs, it unquestionably
had-and still retains in some areas-a bias that makes the landlord
the favored suitor. This article will now examine the impact of New
Jersey Legal Services lawyers in improving dwelling conditions,
keeping tenants in their apartments, and increasing access to housing.

166 Carlin,

Howard & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor: Issues for Socio-

logical Research, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 9, 13-16 (1966). See also Schoshinski, Remedies
of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEO. L.J. 519 (1966).
167 For an overview of some of the eflorts of Legal Services attorneys in this area
see Bross, Law Reforn ,Man Mleets the Slutmlord: Interactions of New Remedies and
Old Buildings in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URB. LAw,. 609 (1971). The author
summarizes the impact of Legal Services as follows:
The primary effort in law reform in the landlord and tenant area has been
defensive. The litigation involving law reformers may generally be classified
under three headings: (a) assurance to tenants of a right to a hearing so that
defenses may be raised to landlord eviction and rent claims; (h) generation of
new defenses to eviction and rent claims; and (c) protection of those tenants
who exercise their defenses, whether those defenses are administrative or
judicial, conmollaw or common sense.

Id. at 611 (f'Ootnote omitted).
168 See generally Comment, Honsing .Maintenanceand Rehabilitation: Legislativ~e
andjludicial Responses, 6 SETIO.N HALL L. REV. 86, 86-91 (1974).
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The Quality of Housing
Obtaining and maintaining habitable conditions in urban residential leaseholds was recognized as a major problem by Legal Services.' 6 9 Traditionally, courts have viewed a lease as a conveyance of
a real property interest. 170 The doctrine of caveat emptor or "buyer
beware" limited the landlord's obligation to transferring possession
to the tenant and leaving that tenant in quiet enjoyment of the leasehold. 17 ' The burden was on the tenant to inspect for defects. Additionally, in the absence of an express agreement, the landlord had no
obligation to maintain the premises in any habitable quality. 172
Tenants were required to pay the rent since, in the eves of the common law, they had what they had bargained for-possession of an
interest in land-regardless of the condition of the leased premises. 1 7 This "buyer beware" principle had an especially severe impact on low-income tenants who were geographically and economically
1 74
relegated to the slum-housing market.
With a beginning recognition of contemporary social needs and
housing realities, courts started to move away from common law
property concepts and embrace a more flexible contract analysis. 1 75
Legal Services attorneys have been instrumental in fashioning remedies for New Jersey tenants in substandard housing.
169

See Gibbons, Landlord-Tenant Problems, in LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE

POOR 275-77 (E. Jarmel ed. 1968). The development of' possible tenant remedies is
discussed at length. See id. at 282-95.
170 Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 382, 140 A.2d 199, 201
(1958). See
generally 3 G. THOMPSON,

COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

§ 1209, at 87 (repl. 1959); Grimes, Caveat Lessee, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REV. 189, 192
(1968); Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past With Guidelinesfor the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 227 (1969).
171 Quinn & Phillips, supra note 170, at 227. The landlord's obligations tinder
the so-called covenant of quiet enjoyment were not of an affirmative nature but rather
negative in character; merely to leave the tenant in possession. See id. at 299 n.5.
172 Comp~are Franklin v. Brown, 21 Jones & Spen. 474, 479 (N.Y.C. Super. Ct. 1886),
aff'd, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889) with Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 62-63,
253 A.2d 167, 170 (1969).
173 See Stewart v. Childs Co., 86 N.J.L. 648, 650-51, 92 A. 392, 393 (Ct. Err. & App.
1914); cf. Duncan Dev. Co. v. Duncan Hardware, Inc., 34 N.J. Super. 293, 298, 112 A.2d
274, 277 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 19 N.J. 328, 116 A.2d 829 (1955). See also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.45, at 267 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Quinn & Phillips, supra
note 170, at 233-35; Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability: An Incipient Trend
in the Law of Landlord-Tenant?, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 123, 12.3-24 (1971).
174 See Bruno, stpra note 165, at 303.
175 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-79 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 836-37
(D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 433, 462 P.2d 470, 474 (1969);
Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 461, 251 A.2d 268, 276-77 (1969); Pines v.
Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596-97, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
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In 1968, a challenge to the common law doctrine was rebuffed
in Peters v. Kelly. 17 6 The tenant's apartment was roach-infested and
had inadequate heating and hot water, which resulted in illness to
various persons in the family. The doors had no locks; the hall had
no lights. 17 7 The building was permeated by "[a] rotten stench
17 8
emanating from the cellar."'
The appellate division of New Jersey's superior court abdicated
its responsibility by summarily dismissing the tenant's showing of
nonhabitability:
We recognize the social problem involved. Tenants in substandard housing should have some reasonably direct and
workable means of compelling a landlord to correct conditions in and about premises that threaten health and safety. However, this is not a judicial function. Solution to the
problem requires administrative regulation and inspection
79
by trained personnel at the local level.1

Two and a half years later, however, New Jersey's highest court found
that bringing pressure to bear on landlords of substandard dwellings
was in fact "a judicial function."' 180

176 98 N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1968).
177Id. at 443-44, 237 A.2d at 636.
178 Id. at 444, 237 A.2d at 636.
179 Id. Without citation of authority, the court stated:
[W]e think that under existing law, the alleged nonhabitable condition of the
leased premises is not a defense to the landlord's suit for possession based
on nonpayment of rent.
Id.
180 In Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969), the New
Jersey supreme court undermined the doctrines that had traditionally relieved a landlord of responsibility for the unsuitability of the leased premises. A commercial tenant vacated a ground floor office because of continual flooding from a concealed defect
in the abutting driveway. Id. at 448-50, 251 A.2d at 270-71. The landlord sued to recover the rent for the balance of the term. Id. at 447-48, 251 A.2d at 270. The supreme
court sustained the tenant's defense that the continual flooding constituted a constructive eviction, Id. at 462, 251 A.2d at 278. It stated that the tenant's right to vacate
could be founded upon "breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment, or material failure
of consideration, or material breach of an implied warranty against latent defects."
Id. at 461, 251 A.2d at 276-77. Moreover, the court made the important observation
that
present day demands of fair treatment for tenants with respect to latent defects remediable by the landlord, either within the demised premises or outside the demised premises, require imposition on him of an implied warranty
against such defects. . . . Such warranty might be described as a limited warranty of habitability.
Id. at 454, 251 A.2d at 273 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Although Reste Realty involved a commercial tenancy, the applicability of its
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In Marini v. Ireland,' a tenant in a two-family house with a
rent of $95 a month engaged a plumber to repair a leaking toilet when
attempts to get the landlord to repair it failed. 18 2 She then deducted
3
the plumber's bill from her rent and sent the landlord the balance.1'
The supreme court noted the trend toward contract analysis in landlord-tenant problems 184 and found that "[t]he very object of the
letting was to furnish the defendant with quarters suitable for living
purposes." 185 Modem social conditions required the implication of
a warranty of habitability against latent defects in every residential
leasehold agreement. 186 The landlord's obligation under this implied
warrant, was no more than maintenance and rehabilitation of "facilities vital to the use of the premises for residential purposes" so that
they were usable at the commencement of the lease and "remain[ed]
18 7
in usable condition during the entire term of the lease. "
The court observed that breach of the warranty of habitability
would constitute a constructive eviction entitling the tenant under
the common law to abandon the premises without liability for rent.' 8 8
The remedy in Marini, however, was more in tune with the realities
of the statevide housing shortage. The tenant was given "the alternative remedy of terminating the cause of the constructive eviction
where as here the cause is the failure to make reasonable repairs. "189
After making the repairs, the tenant was authorized to deduct the
0
cost from future rent.19
habitabilit' principles to a residential leasehold was anticipated in Academy Spires,
Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 403-04, 261 A.2d 413, 417 (L. Div. 1970).
1s1

56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).

182 Id.
183 Id.

at 134, 265 A.2d at 528.
at 134-35, 265 A.2d at 528. The repairs cost $85.72, so that the landlord

received only a small sum that month. Id.
184 Id. at 141-43, 265 A.2d at 532-33.
1s5 Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 533.
186 Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534.

11"7
Id. The court declared that it was "eminently fair and just" to impose such a
warranty. Id. It recognized that where the tenant was responsible for damage, the
tenant would he liable. 1d. The court also balanced the economic realities of the landlord's income, various standards of' decent living, and the possibility of rent-gouging:
The nature of vital facilities and the extent and type of maintenance and repair required is limited and governed by the type of property rented and the
amount of rent reserved.
Id. at 144-45, 265 A.2d at 534.
ss Id. at 144-45, 265 A.2d at 534.
189 Id. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
190 Id. The court explained that
[t]he tenant's recourse to such self-help must be preceded by timely and
adequate notice to the landlord of the faulty condition in order to accord him
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While it is a large step forward, the Marini remedy has apparent limits. If the cost of the repairs exceeds more than a month's rent,
the tenant probably cannot afford it and it is unlikely that the expenditure can be made in installments. Moreover, in large multipledwelling complexes needing major repairs or renovations, the right
to repair and deduct has little meaning.
These apparent limits-repair and deduct or move out-did
not, however, constrict lower courts and Legal Services attorneys
who daily faced the housing crisis in the state. In Academy Spires,
Inc. v. Brown, 19 1 a tenant in an urban multi-apartment complex
withheld rent alleging breach of the warranty of habitability.192
The court candidly recognized that there was virtually no place for
the tenant to move in Essex County 193 and that requiring repairs as a
prerequisite would make the remedy meaningless to most urban
tenants. 194 Consequently, the court fashioned a remedy diminishthe opportunity to inake the necessary replacement or repair. If the tenant
is unable to give such notice after a reasonable attempt, liemay nonetheless
proceed to repair or replace. This does not mean that the tenant is relieved
from the payment of rent so long as the landlord fails to repair. The tenant
has only the alternative remedies of making the repairs or removing from the
premises upon such a constructive eviction.

ld. at 146-47, 265 A.2d at 535. The court .vould reconsider the obiter dictum of the
last two sentences in Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 468-69, 308 A.2d 17, 21 (1973).
See note 204 infra.
191111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex Count\, Dist. Ct. 1970).
192 Id. at 479-80, 268 A.2d at 557. The tenant claimed the warranty of habitability
had been breached because the owner
failed to supply heat and water service to a ninth-story apartment; the incinerator did not function, impairing garbage disposal the hot water supply
failed; water leaked into the bathroom; there were defects in venetian Ili,,ds;
the plaster in the walls was cracked, and the apartment was unpainted.
Id. at 482, 268 A.2d at 559. The court found that in a multi-story apartment building
the "bare living requirements- of a human being were affected by lack of heat, hot
water, garbage disposal, and elevator service. Id. It recognized the inconvenience of
the other complaints, but characterized such facilities as " 'amenities.' - The disrepair,
'at least of the magnitude presented here,'" did not render the premises uninhabitable.
Id. at 482-83, 268 A.2d at 559.
93Id. at 480, 268 A.2d at 558.
94 Id. at 484, 268 A.2d at 560. The court noted the apparent limits of the M\iarini
doctrine, but asked:
Was the tenant required to make the repair to this 400-unit complex as a
prerequisite to availability of the relief given by Marini? If the answer to that
question is in the affirmative, Marini has no meaning to tenants in multi-family
dwellings who need the relief most. Obviously, few such tenants have the
means to lay out the capital, and if they do, why should they repair someone
else's real estate on the chance of a reduction in rent? It is hard to believe
that the Supreme Court intended such a result.
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ing the amount of unpaid rent that was due and owing in propor5
tion to the reduced habitability of the premises. 19
In both Marini and Academy Spires the conditions breaching
the warranty of habitability arose after the commencement of the
lease.1 9 6 In Samuelson v. Quinones,197 a case involving a pre-existing
defect, the trial judge granted a partial abatement for certain conditions' 9 8 but denied the tenant any abatement for lack of adequate
heating facilities because she had observed this condition when she
rented the apartment.' l 9 The appellate division reversed. 2 °0 Although a municipal housing code prohibited rental unless an apartment's heating facilities met the ordinance's standard, the court
rejected the claim that this rendered the lease contract illegal and
entitled the tenant to a total abatement. 2 0 ' The court balanced the
195 Id. at 485-88, 268 A.2d at 561-62.
196See 56 N.J. at 134, 265 A.2d at 528; 111 N.J. Super. at 479, 268 A.2d at 557.
197 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1972).
198 Id. at 340, 291 A.2d at 581. An abatement was allowsed for defects in kitchen
range and sink, leaks, a broken window, cracked walls, cracked and chipped plaster,
and a bathroom door that was hanging loose. Id.
199 Id. The basement apartment never had any heating facilities other than the
gas range in the kitchen. Id. at 339, 291 A.2d at 581.
In Berzito v. Gambino, 114 N.J. Super. 124, 274 A.2d 865 (Union County Dist. Ct.
1971), rev'd, 119 N.J. Super. 332, 291 A.'2d 577 (App. Div. 1972), reu'd, 63 N.J. 460,
308 A.2d 17 (1973), the trial judge, in dictum, commented upon a tenant occupying an
apartment with patent habitability defects:
May a tenant who is a victim of the critical shortage of urban housing enter
into a rental agreement, accept possession of the premises, and thereafter
require the landlord to render the demised premises suitable for habitation
although their condition is known at the time of the letting? It would seem
that the answer must be in the negative. One who agrees in effect to accept the
premises "as is" should not be allowed to obtain an agreement from the landlord as to the rent to be paid, take possession, and then require repairs and
improvements by the landlord....
An opposite conclusion would not be of economic benefit to the tenant
in any event. A landlord obliged to make improvements to the premises
would be entitled to increase the rent substantially, so that the tenant in
most cases would be obliged in turn to seek other living quarters.
114 N.J. Super. at 128-29, 274 A.2d at 868. This observation assumes that the rent
charged by a landlord is not inflated out of relation to the reasonable value of the
premises. Such an assumption, however, is frequently not warranted. See Schoshinski,
supra note 166, at 520.
200 119 N.J. Super. at 343, 291 A.2d at 583.
201 Id. at 340, 343, 291 A.2d at 581-82, 583. The tenant's argument consisted of three
parts: (1) the municipal housing code set the standard of habitability and a breach of
the housing code constituted a breach of warranty of habitability; (2) a lease agreement
where there were housing code violations at the inception of the lease term constituted an illegal and unenforceable contract; and (3) allowing a landlord the benefit
of his agreement where there are code violations "would be against the State's public
policy of protection of urban low-income tenants." Id. at 340, 291 A.2d at 581.
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economic hardship to the landlord against the tenant's need for
housing and concluded that complete denial of rent to the landlord
would ultimately deny any housing to the tenant. 20 2 Consequently
it directed the trial judge to determine "the reasonable value of the
demised premises, with its lack of heating facilities," and then deduct
2 03
any additional abatement for other defective conditions.
In 1973, the remedy of rent abatement was approved by the
New Jersey supreme court in Berzito v. Ganbino.20 4 Additionally,
the court provided a new remedy-an affirmative action for damages resulting from breach of the warranty of habitability.20 Upon
establishing the uninhabitable condition of the premises the tenant
would recover the difference between the rent paid and "the reasonable rental value of the property in its imperfect condition during
20 6
his period of occupancy."
In Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970), the court held that the implied warrant, of habitability is measured by housing code regulations. In Brown .'. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834,
836-37 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968), the court held that violation of the housing code at the
beginning of the term rendered the lease an illegal contract. See generally Daniels,
Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law
Reform in the District of Colnimbia, 59 GEO. L.J. 909 (1971); Note, Judicial Expansion
of Tenants' Private Late Rights: Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in
Residential Urban Leases, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489 (1971); Note, D.C. Housing Regulations, Article 290, Section 2902: Construed Pursuant to Brown v. Southall Realty
Co. and Javins v. First National Realty Corp.-A New Day for the Urban Tenant?, 16
How. L.J. 366 (1971).
202 119 N.J. Super. at 343, 291 A.2d at 583.
203

I d.

204 63 N.J. 460, 469, 308 A.2d 17, 21 (1973). The court recognized that in Marini
- '[(]he ieuci-t
.
,, thc
.....
.t....
..
.
. 1,
of making the repairs
or removing from the premises upon such a constructive eviction.'
Id. at 468, 308
A.2d at 21 (quoting from Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 147, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970)).
However, Justice Sullivan refused to allow "a casual dictuom [to] shackle the Court
to prevent a later exercise of its creative powers in fashioning new remedies as need
and occasion demand.' 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21. In the process the court abolished
the doctrine of independent covenants that had prevented tenants from compelling
landlords to maintain housing in decent condition. The court held the covenant to pay
rent and the covenant or warranty of habitability were "nutually dependent." Id.
205 63 N.J. at 469, 308 A.2d at 22.
206 Id. The court stressed that, before the tenant's right to bring the action matured,
it Ihad stated

the landlord must be given "positive and seasonable notice" of the defective condition,
be requested to take action, and have a reasonable time in which to accomplish the
repairs. Id. Although the court did not mention it, presumably "[i]f the tenant is unable to give such notice alter a reasonable attempt," the cause of action will accrue.
See Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 146, 265 A.2d 526, 535 (1970).
Justice Sullivan suggested some of the factors to be used in determining whether
the warrants of habitability had been breached:
1. Has there been a violation of' any applicable housing code or building

or sanitary regulations?
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The expansion of the warranty of habitability and the affirmative remedy of Berzito show the vitality and potential of the concept
as a means of improving the quality of housing. Habitability is not
to be given a narrow or restricted meaning. Heat and hot water are
not the only requisites of a habitable dwelling. It also includes such
elements as preventing the use of lead paint on walls and providing
adequate locks on doors. 20 7 The creative use of the various habitability remedies to directly affect the landlord's economic return in
the form of rent can provide an incentive to maintain premises in a
safe and decent condition. 20 8 Thus the attorneys representing poor
2. Is the nature of the deficiency or defect such as to affect a vital facility?
3. What is its potential or actual effect upon safety and sanitation?
4. For what length of time has it persisted?
5. What is the age of the structure?
6. What is the amount of the rent?
7. Can the tenant be said to have waived the defect or be estopped to
complain?
8. Was the tenant in any way responsible for the defective condition.
63 N.J. at 470, 308 A.2d at 22.
The court noted that the legislature essentially agreed with the remedy it had
fashioned. A 1971 statute authorized the appointment of a receiver to collect and
administer rents in order to meet standards of health and safety. Id. at 471-73, 308
A.2d at 23-24 (construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76)). There
are as yet no reported cases under the statute. It has, however, an obvious limit. Repairs are made only out of available rents.
207 The warranty of habitability was held to cover a defect preventing use of outdoor areas of a suburban apartment complex where the tenants had relied upon its
availability. Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 583-84, 338
A.2d 21, 24-25 (L. Div. 1975). Further expansion of the warranty, of habitability is
suggested in Braitman v. Overlook Terrace Corp., 68 N.J. 368, 346 A.2d 76 (1975),
where the court held the landlord liable for loss of the tenants' personal property as
a result of a burglary facilitated by inadequate door locks. Justice Pashman, the Chief
Justice, and Justice Sullivan raised the possibility of using the warranty of habitability as the basis for liability. Id. at 387-88 & n.16, 346 A.2d at 86-87.
2o8 Another economic pressure device used by Legal Services attorneys to cause
repairs to be made is the rent strike. The coordinated withholding of rent by a large
group of tenants because of uninhabitable conditions seems to be supported by the
principles enumerated in Marini and its progeny.
One of the largest rent strikes was that involving tenants of the Newark Housing
Authority, especially in the Stella Wright Homes project. An attempt was made to
bring the matter before federal courts. See Housing Authority of the City of Newark
v. Henry, 334 F. Supp. 490, 491-92 (D.N.J. 1971). Although Judge Lacey held that
the federal courts were without removal jurisdiction, the Newark rent strike action
eventually did reach the federal courts, where it was settled. The events involved in
the Newark rent strike are described in David & Callan, Newark's Public Housing
Rent Strike: The High-Rise Ghetto Goes To Court, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 581
(1974). See generally Note, Tenant Rent Strikes, 3 COLUX. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1
(1967); Note, Rent Strike Legislation-New York's Solution to Landlord-Tenant Conflicts, 40 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 253 (1966).
One of the hazards of poverty law practice for attorneys was displayed in this
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tenants have, in part, utilized the law to attempt to equalize the
economic bargaining positions between landlords and tenants.
Besides the indirect remedies of exerting economic pressure
on landlords through the warranty of habitability, Legal Services
has been involved in getting municipalities to cure fundamental
breaches of a standard of safe and decent housing in exigent circumstances. In Jones v. Buford, 20 9 a multiple-dwelling tenant was without heat or hot water. 21 0 After contacting the landlord's agent without
avail, she sought to compel the local board of health to use its statutory authority "to act as agent for the landlord to engage repairmen
and order parts necessary to restore the boiler at the premises to operating condition. " 21 1 The tenant argued that the board of health was
empowered to bill the landlord directly for the expense and place a
2 12
statutory lien on the building in favor of the persons doing the work.
case. Involvement in the Newark rent strike, with the accompanying political tensions, led to the contempt of court conviction of three Legal Services lawyers, which
was ultimately reversed by the New Jersey supreme court. See In re Callan, 122 N.J.
Super. 479, 300 A.2d 868 (Ch.), aff'd, 126 N.J. Super. 103, 312 A.2d 881 (App. Div.
1973), rev'd, 66 N.J. 401, 331 A.2d 612 (1975). Recently, another chapter was added
to the Newark rent strike litigation. The Housing Authority sought to recover rent
arrearages by having deductions from the payments made to tenants receiving welfare
benefits paid directly to the Authority by the welfare agencies. Housing Authority
of Newark v. Commissioner of Institutions and Agencies, 136 N.J. Super. 136, 138-39,
345 A.2d 322, 324 (App. Div. 1975). Legal Services lawyers intervened on behalf of
the tenants. The Housing Authority's request was denied. Id. at 148, 345 A.2d at 329.
209 132 N.J. Super. 209, 333 A.2d 279 (App. Div.), cert. granted, 68 N.J. 151, 343
A.2d 438 (1975).
210 132 N.J. Super. at 211, 333 A.2d at 281.
211 Id. The tenant claimed relief pursuant to N.J. STAr. ANN. § 26: 3 -31(p) (Supp.
1975-76).
212 132 N.J. Super. at 211, 333 A.2d at 281. The statute provides in pertinent part:
The local board of health shall have power to pass, alter or amend ordinances and make rules and regulations in regard to the public health within
its jurisdiction, for the following purposes:
p. To act as the agent for a landlord in the engaging of repairmen and
the ordering of any parts necessary to restore to operating condition the
furnace, boiler or other equipment essential to the proper heating of any residential unit rented by said landlord, provided, however, that at least 24 hours
have elapsed since the tenant has lodged a complaint with the local board of
health, prior to which a bona fide attempt has been made by the tenant to notify
the landlord of the failure of the heating equipment, and the landlord has
failed to take appropriate action, and the outside air temperature is less than
550 F.

Any person who supplies material or services in accordance with this
section shall bill the landlord directly and by filing a notice approved by the
local hoard of health, with the count' clerk, shall have a lien on the premises
where the materials were used or services supplied.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2 6 :3 --31(p) (Supp. 1975-76).
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Although the trial judge dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, 2 13 the appellate division reversed and directed that the
tenant was entitled to the requested relief. 21 4 The court held that
the board of health's grant of power under the statute was "of a mandatory character. The public interest in the health, safety and wel' 21 5
fare of tenants of residential units requires such construction. "
The significance of the Jones v. Buford remedy lies in comparing
it with other alternative forms of relief in the face of an emergency.
The remedy of constructive eviction confronts again the statewide
housing shortage. Neither a receivership action 2 16 nor a Marini repair
and deduct procedure is meaningful where rental income is limited
and repairs are of a major nature. A rent abatement does not provide
heat. Nor do criminal sanctions under housing codes. Furthermore,
injunctive relief by way of code enforcement or a suit for specific
performance of the lease agreement is futile where the landlord is
impecunious.

2 17

213132 N.J. Super. at 211, 333 A.2d at 280.
214 Id. at 216, 333 A.2d at 283.
215Id. at 215, 333 A.2d at 283. The court further stated:
It is apparent
ture intended
protection the
thus conferred,

from the nature and scope of the legislation that the Legislathat the members of the residential renting public, for whose
statute was enacted, should have the right to have the power
exercised for their benefit.

Id.
The court also rejected the arguments that as a Faulkner Act municipality, the
Newark board of health was not subject to the statute, that the board of health's
power was limited to making recommendations concerning ordinances, and that since
no ordinances had been enacted no action could be taken. Id. at 212, 333 A.2d at 281.
216 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76). See note 206 supra.
217The Jones v. Buford remedy raises the practical problem of the financial ability of the board of health to provide the required relief. Even with the grant of a statutory lien as security, the board of health in a city such as Newark might well be unable
to obtain parts or repairs where the suppliers and workers would have to look to the
landlord. They might demand cash in advance. To some extent, the meaninglessness of
a lien on dilapidated buildings is demonstrated by the experience of rent receivership programs which include a statutory lien procedure. See, e.g., Grad, New Sanctions and Remedies in Housing Code Enforcement, 3 URB. LAW. 577, 584 (1971);
Moerdler, Debrot, Quirk, Castrataro & Weidenfeld, A Program for Housing Maintenance and Emergency Repair, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 165, 183-84 (1967); Note, Receivership of Problem Buildings in New York City and its Potential for Decent Housing
of the Poor, 9 COLUMX. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 309, 325-26 & nn.104-05 (1973).
These fiscal concerns are legitimate. However, they are not insurmountable.
First of all, the remedy has not been reality-tested. Suppliers and repairmen may possibly be found who are willing to take the risk in the interest of improving the area
where they themselves live or work. Secondly, the local responsibility to protect the
state interest in health and safety can be coupled with the local power to compel the
landlord to provide funds for such repairs in advance.
In Apartment House Council v. Mayor & Council, 123 N.J. Super. 87, 301 A.2d
484 (L. Div. 1973), aff'd mem., 128 N.J. Super. 192, 319 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1974),
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Eviction--Grounds, Defenses, and Procedures
In addition to the development of remedies regarding habitability, Legal Services attorneys have addressed themselves to the
obstacles facing a tenant in an eviction action. Much of the law of
eviction is a function of the "form of the action" and the forumJudge (now Justice) Pashman considered the constitutionality of an ordinance requiring owners of multiple-dwellings to post security with a commission authorized to
spend the money for repairs where the landlord failed to do so after twenty-four hours'
notice. 123 N.J. Super. at 89, 301 A.2d at 485. Legal Services participated as an amicus.
The ordinance authorized repairs of " 'emergency conditions' " which included:
(1) Lack of adequate ventilation or light;
(2) Lack of adequate and properly functioning sanitary facilities;
(3) Lack ofadequate and healthful water supply;
(4) Structural, mechanical or electrical defects which increase the hazards
of fire, accident or other calamity;
(5) Lack of adequate heat during specified months and specified times
of the day.
Id. at 90, 301 A.2d at 485. The ordinance had a schedule of graduated amounts of
security: $100 for each apartment in buildings with four to twenty-four units; $2,500
for the first twenty-five apartments and $50 for each additional one where there were
twenty-six to forty units, and where there were over forty apartments, $2,500 for the
first twenty-five, $50 for the next fifteen, and $30 for each additional unit. There was
a ceiling of $5,000 on the amount of security that could be required. Id. at 103, 301
A.2d at 492.
The constitutionality of the ordinance was challenged on grounds that it lacked
statutory authorization, denied a hearing into the existence of a purported condition,
denied an appeal from the commission's decision, and placed an unreasonable burden
on landlords. Id. at 90, 301 A.2d at 485. The court rejected all these contentions.
Judge Pashman found statutory authority for the ordinance in the general police
power of municipalities, enabling them to act " 'as may be necessary to carry into
effect the powers and duties conferred and imposed . . .by any laic.' " Id. at 90-91,
301 A.2d at 485-86 (quoting from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2 (1967)) (emphasis by the
court). He further found that the ordinance was an implementation of the statutory
authorization of municipalities to establish "minimum standards" for health and
safety. 123 N.J. Super. at 91, 301 A.2d at 486 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-74 et seq.
(Supp. 1975-76)). Even in the absence of such specific authorization, Judge Pashman
postulated that the inherent police power permitted the regulation. 123 N.J. Super.
at 93-94, 301 A.2d at 487-88.
He summarily dismissed the unreasonableness of the burden on landlords in requiring the deposit:
The landlord who complains he is unable to post the security proves the point
he is trying to challenge; he will be equally as unable to correct an emergency
defective condition should the occasion present itself. The ordinance requests
the landlord, after a fashion, to insure himself to raise the money now, before
an emergency arises, so that the money is there when needed.
Id. at 103, 301 A.2d at 493. While the deposit might not cover the complete cost of a
Jones v. Buford remedy, there may be sufficient cash to induce commencement of repairs and acceptance of a lien for the balance.
For a discussion of another area where third parties affect habitability see Comment, Public Utility Discontinuance and the Residential Lease: Providing a Remedy
for the Residential Tenant's Right to Service, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 690 (1975).
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normally a summary dispossess proceeding 2 18 in the landlord-tenant
division of the county district court. 2 19 The dispossess action has a
2 20
short waiting period between service of process and final hearing,
no counterclaims are allowed 22 1 and there is no pretrial discovery.222
Appeals are limited to issues of jurisdiction with no review of the
223
merits of a case.
Until June 25, 1974,224 a tenant could be evicted in a summary
dispossess action if the tenant: held over and continued in possession
-after expiration of a fixed term or a proper notice to quit; 2 25 held over
after default in rent; 226 destroyed the peace and quiet of the landlord and other tenants; 2 27 willfully damaged the property; 228 continually violated rules of the tenancy; 2 29 or breached any covenants
218 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76). A landlord may also
regain possession pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35-1 et seq. (1952), a statutory
substitute for the common law action of ejectment. A special cause of action is created
where there is one year's rent arrearages. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4 2 - 7 et seq. (1952).
Many of the technical requirements of the intricate common law ejectment proceeding
are eliminated by this special cause of action. 1. LEWINE, LANDLORD AND TENANT
LAw, 23 N.J. PRACTICE § 3573 (1962). This action is brought by means of an ejectment proceeding pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35-1 et seq. (1952). Ejectment
proceedings, however, may only be brought in the superior court or county court and
not the district court. Id. § 2A:35-1. Since they entitle the tenant to all the procedural
rights of pleadings, discovery, jury trial, and full appeal-as in any other superior court
action-they are rarely, if ever, used against urban low-income tenants. Furthermore,
self-help evictions of residential tenants have been illegal since 1971. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:39-1 to -2 (Supp. 1975-76). Thus, summary dispossess proceedings will
invariably be used. For a discussion of the problems prior to 1971 see Gibbons, supra
note 169, at 320-24; Note, Self-Help Eviction: Proposalsfor the Reform of Eviction Procedures in New Jersey, 1 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 315 (1969).
219 N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:6-34(b) (Supp. 197.5-76), bestows jurisdiction upon the
county district court "in actions between landlords and tenants.'" The district court
is one of the "inferior courts of limited jurisdiction" authorized by the state constitution. See N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 1, I 1. Such "courts and their jurisdiction may from
time to time be established, altered or abolished by law.'" Id.
220 N.J.R. 6:2-1 provides a landlord-tenant action shall be heard "not less than
5 days nor more than 15 days from the date of service of the summons."
221 N.J.R. 6:3-4.
222 N.J.R. 6:4-3(a).
223 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952) which provides:
Proceedings had by virtue of this article shall not be appealable except on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, The landlord, however, shall remain liable
in a civil action for unlawful proceedings under this article.
224 On this date, amendments to the summary dispossess act became effective. See
Law of June 25, 1974, ch. 49, [1974] N.J. Laws 119 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
4§ 2A:18-53, 2A:18-61 to -61.5 (Supp. 197,5-76)).
225 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53(a) (1952), as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53
(Supp. 1975-76).
226
Id. § 2A:18-53(b).
227 Id.
§ 2A: 18-53(c)(1).
228 Id.
§ 2A: 18-53(c)(2).
3
229 Id. § 2A: 18-53(c)( ).
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for which the landlord had reserved a right of re-entry. 23 0 The 1974
amendment modified the grounds for eviction in certain circum-

stances. 231
The most commonly occurring grounds for eviction in cases
involving low-income tenants were the default in rent and the holdover after termination of the tenancy. These presented separate
but related problems for anti-poverty attorneys.
As a matter of course, much of the work done by Legal Services
in the area of habitability arose in the context of a nonpayment dispossess proceeding. Under the dispossess act, where rent was unpaid the tenant had essentially only one means of avoiding eviction-to pay the rent, thereby depriving the court of jurisdiction. 2 2
In Peters v. Kelly, the uninhabitable condition of the leasehold had
been raised as an equitable defense to the action for possession
based upon nonpayment. 23 3 The trial judge rejected the offer of
proof. 23 4 On appeal, the tenant faced the problem, unique to dispossess proceedings, of establishing her right to the appeal. The
dispossess act provides that such an eviction judgment "shall not be
appealable except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction." 23 5 The
tenant argued that refusal to consider her equitable defense went
to the district court's jurisdiction. 236 The appellate division disagreed and dismissed the appeal. 23 7

Id. § 2A: 18-53(c)(4).
See notes 281-82 infra and accompanying text.
232 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-55 (1952) provides in pertinent part:
If, in [a nonpayment action], the tenant ... shall at any time on or before
entry of final judgment, pay to the clerk of the court the rent claimed to be
in default, together with the accrued costs of the proceedings, all proceedings shall be stopped.
The tenant's payment of rent and costs pursuant to this section was held to have
jurisdictional consequences in Saveriano v. Saracco, 97 N.J. Super. 43, 47, 234 A.2d
244, 246 (App. Div. 1967). Relying upon this interpretation and another section of
the dispossess act which prohibits issuance of the warrant of removal until three days
after judgment for possession has been entered, a trial judge stated that "the tenant
as a practical matter has three days in which to pay the amount he is in default in order
to remain in possession." Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 400,
261 A.2d 413, 415 (L. Div. 1970). This three-day period was accepted in practice. Recently, however, another trial judge characterized the statement in Academy Spires
as an unwarranted and unsupportable dictum. Workman's Automatic Music Serv.,
Inc. v. New Colony Diner, Inc., 136 N.J. Super. 131, 133-34, 344 A.2d 794, 795-96
(Camden County Dist. Ct. 1975).
233 98 N.J. Super. at 443, 237 A.2d at 636.
234 Id.
235N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952).
236 98 N.J. Super. at 444, 237 A.2d at 636.
237 Id. at 444-45, 237 A.2d at 636-37. The court stated:
Once the landlord and tenant relationship is proved and a default in the pay230
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In Marini, the supreme court expressly overruled Peters v.
Kelly. 2 38 It reviewed the history of the summary dispossess proceeding and emphasized that all elements of a statutory ground of

removal must be present to vest the district court with jurisdiction. 2 3 9 Noting that an action based on nonpayment arose from
default in the payment of rent,' -240 the court stated:

"

'a

The jurisdictional issue of "default" encompasses the question of whether the amount of rent alleged to be in default, is due,
unpaid and owing, not only whether it is due and unpaid. The mere
fact of the tenant's failure to pay rent in full as provided in the
lease is not in and of itself a sufficient fact to meet the statutory
jurisdictional requisite. Thus a tenant's evidence in substantiation
of a defense that there is no default or that the default is not in
the amount alleged by the landlord, is admissible on the jurisdictional issue. Consideration must be given not only to a legal
defense but as well to an equitable excuse for non-payment, such
as confession and avoidance, which would relieve the tenant of the
duty of paying and hence make the unpaid rent in whole or part
due but not owing and thus not in "default."241
The court held that equitable defenses to payment of rent were
available in the county district court and that the trial judge's failure
to consider such defenses was a jurisdictional issue that could be
appealed.2 42 Then considering the merits of the tenant's equitable
defense, the court articulated the landlord's duty to maintain the
premises in habitable condition and formulated the repair and deduct
ment of rent shown, equitable defenses asserted to offset or avoid the duty to

pay rent go to the merits of the action rather than the jurisdiction of the court.
Id. at 444, 237 A.2d at 636. This view of the district court's jurisdiction combined
with the appellate division's statement in Peters that uninhabitability is no defense to
nonpayment frustrated attempts at reform. It reinforced the reluctance of district
court judges to exercise their existing, albeit limited, equitable power. See Bruno, supra
note 165, at 301.
238 56 N.J. at 140, 265 A.2d at 531.
239 Id. at 137-39, 265 A.2d at 529-31.
240 Id. at 136, 265 A.2d at 529 (quoting from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53(a) (1952),
as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53(a) (Supp. 1975-76)).
241 56 N.J. at 139, 265 A.2d at 530-31 (emphasis in original).
242 Id. at 139, 265 A.2d at 531. The court noted that prior case law required the
district court to deal with equitable issues involved in an action within its jurisdiction.
See Carteret Properties v. Variety Donuts, Inc., 49 N.J. 116, 124, 228 A.2d 674, 678
(1967); Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 469, 173 A.2d 270,
275-76 (1961). Prior to the De Marco decision, there was doubt as to whether the
county district court had any equitable jurisdiction. Lynch, Lack of Jurisdiction of the
Subject Matter in the New Jersey Courts: Application of N.J.R. 1:13-4, The Transfer
of Causes Rule, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 12 & n.47 (1974).
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renedy. 2 43 Following Marini, courts at both the trial and appellate
levels entertained equitable defenses based on nonhabitability and
243 56 N.J. at 140-46, 265 A.2d at 531-35. This aspect of the decision is examined
at notes 181-90 supra and accompanying text.
The supreme court noted that allowing a habitability' defense both as to the merits of an eviction proceeding and as to the jurisdiction of the court to hear it would probably result in an increase in trials and appeals. 56 N.J. at 147, 265 A.2d at 535. The
court stated:
By way of warning, however, it should be noted that the foregoing does not
constitute an invitation to obstruct the recovery of possession by a landlord
legitimately entitled thereto. It is therefore suggested that if the trial of the
matter is delayed the defendant may be required to deposit the full amount of
unpaid rent in order to protect the landlord if he prevails. Also, an application for a stay of an order of removal on appeal should be critically analyzed
and not automatically granted.
Id.
Some trial judges require the entire amount of claimed unpaid rent to be deposited in court before they will hear a habitability defense. Allowance is made for
repairs by the tenant if the receipts are presented and the repairs were major. If the
tenant is unable to comply with this prerequisite, the court refuses to hear the habitability defense and enters a judgment for possession. Authority for this procedure is
based upon the above statement in Marini.
This requirement is not justified by Marini. The supreme court was concerned
about delaying tactics that would prevent the landlord from regaining possession. In
the ordinary case, there is no delay: the tenant and Legal Services counsel appear and
are prepared to present their defense on the return (late. The tenant may be unable
to deposit the disputed rent for a variety of reasons, such as an emergency expenditure for health care. Cf. Bruno, supra note 165, at 300 n.14. Regardless of the deposit
in court, the amount of an abatement may be determined immediately so that there is
no delay. If the habitability' defense is found insufficient, judgment for possession
may be entered the same day. The tenant must then either pay the rent or be evicted.
If the defense is sustained, judgment for possession is still entered the same day and
the tenant must pay the abated amount of rent or be evicted. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-55 (1952). Denial of the habitability defense in these circumstances is nt
only harsh and inequitable, but also results in a judgment beyond the jursidiction of
the court under the principles enunciated in Marini.
Delay in the recovery of premises where a habitability defense is raised is often
created by the trial judge. Apparently because there is no pretrial discovery in the summary dispossess proceeding, a trial judge may adjourn the trial to allow the landlord
to prepare a response to the habitability defense. Recovery of possession is thus "obstructed" and the tenant is required to deposit the rent into court. However, this approach, in fact, penalizes the tenant because the landlord is not ready.
Requiring the tenant to make the deposit also gives the landlord a remedy to
which he is not entitled in a summary dispossess action-damages for unpaid rent.
In Sprock v. James, 115 N.J. Super. 111, 278 A.2d 421 (App. Div. 1971), Legal Services attorneys appealed the actions of a district court judge who had entered judgment for possession without hearing the tenants' habitability defense and had turned
over to the landlord rent that had been paid into court. Id. at 112, 278 A.2d at 422.
The rents had been deposited with the court while the tenants applied for removal
of the action to the superior court. Id. at 113, 278 A.2d at 422; see N.J. STAr. ANN.
§ 2A:18-60 (1952). This was a delay resulting from the tenants' actions and legitimately requiring the deposit. The tenants' motion for removal was denied. 115 N.J. Super.
at 113, 278 A.2d at 422. The district court judge apparently directed the turnover of
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fashioned the equitable remedy of percentage rent abatements. 244
When the supreme court approved the abatement remedy in
Berzito, a major doctrinal reform was achieved-the abolition of
the doctrine of independent covenants. The court specifically stated
that the doctrine had outlived its historical justification. 245 It held
that the tenant's obligation to pay rent and the landlord's obligation
to provide habitable premises "are for all purposes mutually dependent."246 Consequently, a tenant in a substandard dwelling who
had been unable to persuade the landlord to make repairs had a
viable defense to a summary dispossess action for nonpayment of rent.
In spite of Berzito's development of this defense to a nonpayment eviction, it did not completely relieve tenants of the harshness of the summary dispossess proceeding. A habitability defense
the escrowed rents in response to the landlord's claim that "possession was not enough,
and that if she did not receive the rents as well, her mortgage would be foreclosed."
Id. The appellate division, in reversing, noted the "inconsistency" of the trial court's
rulings:

The actions were simply for possession on the ground of nonpayment of rent.
Brought as they were under the summary dispossess statute, they were not
actions for recovery of the rent. To the extent that the rent, held in escrow by
direction of the court, was paid over to the landlord, it gave the landlord a remedy not sought and not available in her particular action. To the extent that
payment was thus made, the payment abrogated the grounds for possession•
• . . [W]e hold to the opinion, as defendants urge, that the court's action in
permitting the landlord to have both possession and the rent was error.
Id. at 113-14, 278 A.2d at 423.
244 See, e.g., Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 342-43, 291 A.2d 580,
583 (App. Div. 1972); Sprock v. James, 115 N.J. Super. 111, 115, 278 A.2d 421, 423
(App. Div. 1971); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 583-84,
338 A.2d 21, 24-25 (L. Div. 1975); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super.
477, 483-85, 268 A.2d 556, 559-62 (Essex Countx' Dist. Ct. 1970); cf. Morrocco
v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super. 226, 233, 270 A.2d 739, 742-43 (L. Div. 1970).
A set of guidelines listing suggested percentage abatements for major habitability
defects was prepared by a Legal Services attorney and recognized by the appellate
division in an unreported case. Bruno, Rent Abatement: A Reasonable Remedy for
Aggrieved Tenants, 2 SETON HALL L. REx'. 357, 363-65 & App. I at 366 (1971).
245 63 N.J. at 468, 308 A.2d at 21. The court stated:
It has been persuasively argued that while the doctrine of independent
covenants, and the strict application of the rule of caveat emptor historically
so typical of leasing arrangements, may have resulted in fulfilling the reasonable needs and expectations of landlords and tenants in the agrarian society'
of medieval England, this is no longer true in modern urban and suburban
society. Today the tenant needs and expects more than the mere land itself.
He generally needs and expects adequate shelter, heat, light, water, sanitation and maintenance. It is obviously unsatisfactory to tell him that he may
sue his landlord for any failure to supply these necessities, but that at the
same time he must make recurring rental payments as they fall due.
Id.
246 Id. at 469, 308 A.2d at 21.
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was usually preceded by complaints either to the landlord or to local
housing code authorities concerning conditions in the apartment.
Since most low-income tenants do not have written leases and rent
on a month-to-month basis, 2 4 7 landlords could rid themselves of
complaining, troublesome tenants simply by giving thirty days'
notice to quit.2 48 The tenant might also be forced out by substantially
increasing the rent on thirty days' notice. These practices, known
as retaliatory or reprisal evictions, had the effect of dissuading
249
tenants from seeking to improve their living conditions.
The problem was recognized by Legal Services. 5 ° While a
statute enacted in 1967 made it a disorderly persons offense for a
landlord to threaten or take reprisals against a tenant who reported
housing code violation1s, 25 1 no direct relief was available to the tenant
in a dispossess proceeding.252
247 Bruno, supra note 165, at 305.
248 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-56(b) (1952).

Bruno, supra note 165, at 304-05.
See Gibbons, supra note 169, at 289-90, 295-302. In this early 1968 handbook
for New Jersey Legal Services attorneys, various nonlegal ways of avoiding landlord
reprisals to complaints to housing code authorities, such as obscuring the identity of
the complaining tenant, were suggested. 1I. at 296-98.
251 Law of Oct. 5, 1967, ch. 215, [1967] N.J. Laws 805 (repealed 1970). The constitutionality of the statute was sustained in State v. Field, 107 N.J. Super. 107, 257
A.2d 127 (App. Div. 1969).
252 Bruno, supra note 165, at 305-06. The disorderly persons statute was seen as
creating a possible private cause of action for damages or injunctive relief on the
theory that it established a standard of conduct, that violation was tortious, and that
tenants were within the group of persons intended to be protected by the penal statute. Gibbons, supra note 169, at 299. It was also argued in this Legal Services guide
that the disorderly persons statute could compel an impied defense in eviction proceedings because of the statement of public policy that it contained. id. Constitutional guarantees were also seen as protecting against retaliatory evictions. Two alternative theories were proposed: protection "from unreasonable interference by private
parties with the exercise of [a tenant's] right to inform government of violation of its
laws" and interference with the fourteenth amendment right "to petition government for a redress of grievances." Id. at 299-300 (emphasis in original). The use of the
summary dispossess statute to enforce the retaliatory eviction should constitute suLIffcient "state action- under the fourteenth amendment to invoke the doctrine of Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Gibbons, supra note 169, at 301.
The redress-of-grievances argument was recognized in Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687, 690-99 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969). In Alexander
Hamilton Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 N.J. Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7 (Hudson
County Dist. Ct. 1969), a non-Legal Services case, the tenant was served with a notice to quit after he signed a petition for repair of housing code violations. Id. at 90,
257 A.2d at 7-8. The court found that the petition and the tenant's leadership of a
tenants' group were the reasons for the eviction. Id. at 91, 257 A.2d at 8. Referring
to the policy embodied in the disorderly persons statute, the court held that the tenant had an equitable defense to the retaliatory eviction. Id.
Noting the Whaley decision and the problem of retaliatory evictions, a legisla249
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The new tenants' rights announced in Marini in May 1970 intensified the need for protection. In the fall of 1970, the New Jersey
legislature responded and enacted the Landlord and Tenant Reprisal
Law. 25 3 This statute prohibited a landlord from evicting a tenant
as a reprisal for complaints to governmental authorities regarding
the condition of the leased premises or for the tenant's participation
254
in lawful organizing activities.
tive study suggested that "[t]he penal element . . . could be replaced by the establishment of a civil action for protecting the leasehold of a tenant who exercises" rights
of suing the landlord, reporting housing violations, organizing or joining tenants'
groups. NEW JERSEY LANDLORD

TENANT RELATIONSHIP

STUDY COMM'N,

INTERIM

REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR & LEGISLATURE 19-20 & n.4 (1970).
23 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76). The statute has been
described as "one of the strongest retaliatory eviction laws in the country." Meiser,
Litigating on Behalf of Mobile Home Tenants, 5 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 453, 457
(1974).
254 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (Snpp. 1975-76) provides:
No landlord of premises or units to which this act is applicable shall
serve a notice to quit upon any tenant or institute any action against a tenant
to recover possession of premises, whether by summary dispossess proceedings,
civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise:
a. As a reprisal for the tenant's efforts to secure or enforce any rights
under the lease or contract, or under the laws of the State of New Jersey or
its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States; or
b. As a reprisal for the tenant's good faith complaint to a governmental
authority of the landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety law, regulation, code or ordinance, or State law or regulation which has as its objective the regulation of premises used for dwelling purposes; or
c. As a reprisal for the tenant's being an organizer of, a member of, or
involved in any activities of, any lawful organization; or
d. On account of the tenant's failure or refusal to comply with the terms
of the tenancy as altered by the landlord, if the landlord shall have altered
substantially the terms of the tenancy as a reprisal for any actions of the tenant set forth in subsection a, b, and c of section 1 of this act. Substantial
alteration shall include the refusal to renew a lease or to continue a tenancy
of the tenant without cause.
Under subsection b of this section the tenant shall originally bring his
good faith complaint to the attention of the landlord or his agent and give
the landlord a reasonable time to correct the violation before complaining
to a governmental authority.
A landlord shall be subject to a civil action by the tenant for damages and
other appropriate relief, including injunctive and other equitable remedies,
as may be determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in every case in
which the landlord has violated the provisions of this section.
The validity of the statute was sustained over several constitutional challenges
in Troy Hills Village, Inc. v. Fischler, 122 N.J. Super. 572, 301 A.2d 177 (L. Div.
1971), aff'd mnern., 122 N.J. Super. 525, 301 A.2d 153 (App. Div. 1973). Although not
applied retroactively, the policy of the statute was implemented in cases arising before its effective date. See E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 22425, 281 A.2d 544, 546 (App. Div. 1971); Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J.
Super. 445, 447-49, 271 A.2d 615, 616-17 (Ch. 1970).
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In E. & E. Neuman, Inc. v. Hallock,2 5 5 the tenant made complaints and organized a tenants' meeting.2 56 A little over a month
after the meeting, the tenant received a notice increasing his rent
from $70 to $200 a month. 25 7 When the increased rent was not paid,
the landlord instituted a summary dispossess action and received a
judgment for possession. 5 8 In order to reach the tenant's retaliatory
eviction defense, the appellate division was confronted with the
2 59
nonreviewability provisions of the summary dispossess statute.
The court adopted the view of jurisdiction developed in Marini:
Since the landlord-tenant court is a statutory creation, all the
statutory prerequisites must be met in order for the County district court to gain jurisdiction. In the instant case one of these
prerequisites is the "default" in the payment of rent. If defendant's contention is correct, the landlord would not have lawfully
raised the rent and therefore there would have been no "default."
260
The County district court would thus have had no jurisdiction.
The statute is applicable "to all rental premises or units used for dwelling purposes except owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.13 (Supp. 1975-76). The scope of the statute's applicability
has been examined, and arguments for protection in its absence have been made. See
Meiser, supra note 253, at 457-60. The arguments are based upon public policy and
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 459-60. The likelihood of a finding of sufficient
state action in judicial enforcement of an eviction is doubted because of "[t]he specter of limitless state action springing from every judicial decision." Id. at 460 (emphasis in original). An additional argument in support of protection from landlord reprisals could be framed in terms of the state constitution. There is no state-action requirement in the state guarantees of equal protection and petition for redress of
grievances. See N.J. CONST. art. 1,
1, 18. See also Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.CP. v. Townshio of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174-75, 336 A.2d 713, 725, appeal
disinissed, 96 S. Ct. 18 (1975); State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 299-303, 277 A.2d 369, 37072
(1971). While the legislative policy in limiting the applicability of the statute seems
to be a balance of the landlord's interest in closer control over premises used as a home
by the landlord's family, a tenant still should have some protection against arbitrary
eviction. Such a tenant is still entitled to the benefits of the warrantNY of habitability.
Is the tenant to be denied the means of enforcing the warranty?
255 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A,2d 544 (App. Div. 1971).
256 Id. at 222-23, 281 A.2d at 545. The tenant informed the landlord's agent of a
lack of water pressure in his apartment. When no action was taken, he contacted the
local housing code authorities who made several inspections. Id. at 222, 281 A.2d at
545. The tenant also held a tenants' meeting in his apartment. The day after the
meeting the landlord's agent said "there would be no more meetings in their apartment; that it was against fire regulations." Id. at 223, 281 A.2d at 545.
257 Id. at 223, 281 A.2d at 545. The landlord claimed that increased expenses required raising the rent, but only one of the other nine tenants received a rental increase,
from $80 to $100 a month. Id.
258 Id.
259 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952)).
260 L16 N.J. Super. at 224, 281 A.2d at 545-46. The court held that although the
statute could not be applied because it became effective after the events in the case,

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 233

The reprisal statute creates a rebuttable presumption that a
notice to quit is retaliatory if it is given after the tenant seeks to enforce rights, complains to authorities, or participates in organizing
activities. 26 1 The scope of this presumption was explored in Silberg
v. Lipscomb.262 A tenants' association was formed to negotiate with
the landlord regarding conditions in the apartments. When no satisfactory response was obtained, the tenants filed a petition on June
30, 1971 to place the building in receivership.26 3 On July 2, the court
ordered the appointment of an administrator for the building. The
same day the landlord prepared and immediately served notices to
quit on all tenants, terminating the tenancies as of September 1.
Summary dispossess proceedings were instituted when the tenants
2 64
did not move.
The landlord claimed that he intended to remodel the premises,
subdivide the property, and sell the buildings as two-family dwellings. The presence of the tenants increased the difficulty and expense
it recognized the statute as a codification of existing policy proscribing reprisals and
remanded the action for consideration of the equitable defense. Id. at 224-25, 281
A.2d at 546.
261 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.12 (Snpp. 1975-76) provides:
In any action or proceeding instituted by or against a tenant, the receipt
by the tenant of a notice to quit or any substantial alteration of the terms of
the tenancy without cause after:
a. The tenant attempts to secure or enforce any rights under the lease
or contract, or under the laws of the State of New Jersey, or its governmental
subdivisions, or of the United States; or
b. The tenant, having brought a good faith complaint to the attention of
the landlord and having given him a reasonable time to correct the alleged
violation, complains to a governmental authority with a report of the landlord's alleged violation of any health or safety' law, regulation, code or ordinance; or
c. The tenant organizes, becomes a member of, or becomes involved in
any activities of, any lawful organization; or
d. Judgment [that a notice to quit or an action to recover possession is
retaliatory] is entered for the tenant in a previous action for recovery of premises between the parties; shall create a rebuttable presumption that such
notice or alteration is a reprisal against the tenant for making such attempt,
report, complaint, or for being an organizer of, a member of, or involved in
any activities of, any lawful organization. No reprisal shall be presumed
under this section based upon the failure of a landlord to renew a lease or
tenancy when so requested by a tenant if such request is made sooner than
90 days before the expiration date of the lease or tenancy, or the renewal
date set forth in the lease agreement, whichever later occurs.
(Footnote omitted.)
262 117 N.J. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (Union County Dist. Ct. 1971).
26
3 Id. at 492, 285 A.2d at 86. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 197576).
264 117 N.J. Super. at 493, 285 A.2d at 86-87.
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of the landlord's work and, realizing that the court had the discretionary power to stay the evictions for tip to six2 6months,
he was at5
tempting to " 'coordinate' " the various activities.
While the trial judge found no "actual malice or hostility"
directed toward the tenants and that the dominant motive for the
eviction was economic, it held that this alone did not dispose of the
issue of reprisal.2 6 6 The court observed that prior to serving the
notices to quit the landlord did not consider the possibility and
economic feasibility of performing the work with the tenants in
possession. 2 6 7 It found that the institution of the receivership proceeding by the tenants prompted the landlord's decision and precluded "further and more complete consideration" of alternatives
to the eviction.268 Therefore, the court ruled
that where a landlord, in reaching a decision to evict a tenant,
considers as one of the factors favoring that decision the activities
of the tenant described in [the statute], then the notice to quit is
a "reprisal" within the meaning of the act, although other factors
2 69
may also be present or even dominant.

The statutory presumption of reprisal could be rebutted only by
demonstrating "that the decision to evict was reached independent
of any consideration of the activities of the tenants protected by
the statute. "270
The use of the retaliatory eviction defense to prevent discriminatory treatment of a tenant in a multiple-dwelling was achieved
265Id. at 493-94, 285 A.2d at 87.
26 Id. at 494, 285 A.2d at 87.

267 Id. at 495, 285 A.2d at 88. The court reasoned:
Here the court finds, as stated, that the dominant reason was the economic
consideration of having the work performed at less cost. But obviously, to
reach that decision on an economic basis alone, the landlord had to consider
possible counterbalancing factors such as the receipt of rent while the work
was in progress.
Id.
'

268 Id.

269 Id. at 496, 285 A.2d at 88.
270 Id. Although the language of the court is clear, the testimony of a Legal Services attorney before a legislative hearing suggests that despite the statutory presumoption the defense is difficult to sustain:
[Tihe landlord merely states-and this is the practice in court-that this is no
reprisal. Even in the case where the court finds there is a reprisal motive to
notice for a tenant to terminate their tenancy, the typical situation is that the
landlord testifies that this is not a reprisal. This testimony also puts the
burden back on the tenant to prove the reprisal.
Hearing on Assembly Bills 58, 232, 284, 940, 943, 946, 947, 951, 953, 954, 1048 & 1060
Before the N.J. Assembly Comm. on Commerce, Industry and Professions 68 (Mar. 5,
1974) (statement of Philip Steinfeld, Esq.)
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in PMS Realty Co. v. Guarino.27 1 A notice to quit had been served 2 72
on three tenants who belonged to a tenants' association and had
2 73
lodged complaints regarding conditions in their apartments.
There was no dispute that children of the tenants, "among others,"
had damaged the premises. 274 The landlord therefore argued that
the evictions were not retaliatory. 275 The court held that although a
landlord did not have "to sit idly by and watch his property be destroyed deliberately," the landlord cannot discriminate in the use
of dispossess proceedings to remove destructive tenants. 276 The
evidence indicated that children of other tenants had also done
damage but no other evictions were instituted. The landlord was
required to show either that only the children of the tenants served
with notices to quit had participated or that proceedings had been
instituted against all families involved.277
At the same time that Legal Services attorneys were attempting
law reform on behalf of low-income tenants, a predominantly middleclass based tenants' group-the New Jersey Tenants Organization
(NJTO--was formed. This group has proved to be a dominant force
in changing state law. Legal Services attorneys worked closely with
NJTO and were actively involved in the legislative activities of the
association. 2 78 This coalition was successful in having a number of
reform statutes enacted in New Jersey. 2 79 In 1974, the combination
126 N.J. Super. 134, 312 A.2d 898 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1973).
272 Judge Albano extensively reviewed the time requirements for service of a notice to quit terminating a month-to-month tenancy. Id. at 135-37, 312 A.2d at 898-900.
273 Id. at 138, 312 A.2d at 900.
271

274

Id.

275

Id.

276 Id. at 139, 312 A.2d at 900.

Id.
278 Legal Services attorneys have filed briefs and appeared as amici curiae on
277

behalf of NJTO. See, e.g., Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Iganamort
v. Borough of Fort Lee, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298 (1973); Leone Management Corp.
v. Board of Comm'rs, 130 N.J. Super. 569, 328 A.2d 26 (L. Div. 1974). They have also
testified at hearings on legislation in which NJTO was actively involved. See, e.g.,
Hearing on Assembly Bills 58, 232, 284, 940, 943, 946, 947, 951, 953, 954, 1048 & 1060
Before the N.J. Assembly Comm. on Commerce, Industry and Professions 37, 48, 64, 65
(Mar. 6, 1974).
279 In June 1971, the legislature amended the statute concerning self-help distraint for rent to exclude residential leaseholds. See Law of June 21, 1971, ch. 228,
[1971] N.J. Laws 1144 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:33-1 (Supp. 1975-76)). At
the same time it eliminated self-help evictions. See Law of June 21, 1971, ch. 227,
[1971] N.J. Laws 1143 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:39-1 (Supp. 1975-76)). The
legislature also enacted the receivership statute in June 1971. See Law of June 21, 1971,
ch. 224, [1971] N.J. Laws 1124 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp.
1975-76)). It also passed significant amendments to the security-deposit statute. See
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of the efforts of concerned tenants' associations, spearheaded by
NJTO, and the litigation-thrust of Legal Services attorneys resulted
in the passage of a package of four landlord-tenant bills by the legislature. 280 Perhaps the most important is the "Good Cause Eviction Act," which allows the landlord-tenant relationship in "other
than owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units"
to continue as long as both parties act in good faith. 28 ' The statute
Law of June 21, 1971, ch. 223, [1971] N.J. Laws 1121 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:8-19 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76)).
280 Law of June 24, 1974, ch. 47, [1974] N.J. Laws 116 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:42-10.15, -10.16 (Supp. 1975-76)) (Fair Eviction Notice Act requiring three
days' notice before execution of warrant of removal); Law of June 25, 1974, ch. 48,
[1974] N.J. Laws 117 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8-38 to -42 (Supp. 1975-76))
(landlord required to provide tenant with information concerning federal crime insurance); Law of June 25, 1974, ch. 49, [1974] N.J. Laws 119 (codified at N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A: 18-61.1 to -61.5 (Supp. 1975-76)) (removal of tenants for stated causes and
requiring certain notices); Law of June 25, 1974, ch. 50, [1974] N.J. Laws 123 (codified
at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:8-27 to -37 (Supp. 1975-76)) (landlord registration statement of names and addresses of agents).
281 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76). The statute only allows
eviction
upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause:
a. The person fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease whether
the same be oral or written;
b. The person has continued to be, after written notice to cease, so disorderly as to destroy the peace and quiet of the occupants or other tenants
living in said house or neighborhood;
c. The person has willfully or by reason of gross negligence caused or
allowed destruction, damage or injury to the premises;
d. The person has continued, after written notice to cease, to substantially violate or breach any of the landlord's rules and regulations governing said
premises, provided uChit rles and rcgulation are rea-nnable and have been
accepted in writing by the tenant or made a part of the lease;
e. The person has continued, after written notice to cease, to substantially violate or breach any of the covenants or agreements contained in the lease
for the premises where a right of re-entry is reserved to the landlord in the
lease for a violation of such covenant or agreement, provided that such covenant or agreement is reasonable;
f. The person has failed to pay rent after a valid notice to quit and notice of increase of said rent, provided the increase in rent is not unconscionable and complies with any and all other laws or municipal ordinances governing rent increases.
g. The landlord or owner seeks to permanently board up or demolish
the premises because he has been cited by local or State housing inspectors
for substantial violations affecting the health and safety of tenants and it is
economically unfeasible for the owner to eliminate the violations. In those
cases where the tenant is being removed because of the existence of substantial violations of law affecting health and safety, no warrant for possession shall be issued until [N.J. SWAT. ANN. § 52:31B-1 et seq. (Supp. 1975-76)]
has been complied with.
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abolished the holdover grounds of eviction which had previously
allowed arbitrary termination of a tenancy, 28 2 thus providing substantial protection of the tenant's home.
h. The owner seeks to retire permanently the building or the mobile
home park from the rental housing market.
i. The landlord or owner proposes, at the termination of a lease, reasonable changes of substance in the terms and conditions of the lease, including specifically any change in the term thereof, which the tenant, after
written notice, refuses to accept.
j. The person, after written notice to cease, has habitually failed to pay
rent.
Id. § 2A:18-61.1. A landlord may not evict or refuse to renew a lease, which is tantamount to an eviction, "except for good cause" as defined by the statute. Id. § 2A: 18-61.3.
These provisions may not be waived. Id. § 2A:18-61.4. The statute also prescribes
the notice and time of service necessary to terminate a tenancy. Id. § 2A:18-61.2.
Tenants not within the scope of the statute are still subject to the provisions of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53.
The constitutionality of the statute has been upheld in general. Stambolous v.
.McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 573, 342 A.2d 529, 532 (App. Div. 1975); Bradley v.
Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429, 433-34, 334 A.2d 61, 63 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 68 N.J.
149, 343 A.2d 437 (1975); Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158, 168, 342 A.2d 886,
891 (L. Div. 1975); Barry Gardens v. Passaic, 130 N.J. Super. 369, 377, 327 A.2d 250,
254 (L. Div. 1974); 25 Fairmount Avenue, Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 28586, 326 A.2d 106, 111 (Bergen County Dist. Ct. 1974). In Sabato, however, the court
held the statute unconstitutional insofar as it prevented a landlord from evicting a
tenant for the landlord's personal occupancy. 135 N.J. Super. at 178, 342 A.2d at 897.
A similar exception for an owner-occupancy was achieved in Bradley by viewing a
two-family house leased to tenants as being constructively owner-occupied as of the
(late of purchase and thus not subject to the statute. 132 N.J. Super. at 433-34, 334
A.2d at 63-64.
For a more extensive examination of this statute see Note., New Rights for New
Jersey Tenants-"Good Cause" Evi'tion and "Reasonable" Rents, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN
L.J. 56.5 (1975). Amendments to the statute we re recently enacted. Lass of Feb. 19,
1976. ch. :311, [1976] N.J. SESS. L. SERV. 839-45.
282 Note, supra note 281, at 566-67. The possibility of eliminating notices to quit
"arbitrarily and without cause" had been identified as meriting consideration by
a joint legislative commission. NEW JERSEY LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP
STUDY COMM'N, INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR & LEGISLATURE 13 (1970).

Related to the arbitrary termination of a tenancy through a notice to quit without good cause is the use of oppressive terms in a written lease. See generally Gibbons,
supra note 169, at 314-15. In Lee v. Housing Authority, 119 N.J. Super. 72, 290 A.2d
160 (Union Count-\- Dist. Ct. 1972), Legal Services attorneys challenged a public
housing lease which contained a provision in which the tenant waived " 'all notice
required by law to terminate his tenancy and all legal proceedings to recover possession.' " Id. at 74, 290 A.2d at 161. This provision as well as other clauses violated
HUD public housing regulations. Id. at 74-75, 290 A.2d at 161-62. The regulations
included a requirement that the tenancy be terminated "for good cause only" and provided for an administrative hearing. Id. at 74, 290 A.2d at 161. The court held that
the housing authority was bound by the regulations and that the lease provisions
denied the tenants due process. Id. at 78-79, 290 A.2d at 163-64. The court reasoned:
It is clear that local housing authorities are necessarily subject to
greater restrictions than private landlords. Their goal is not financial profit
but to provide housing to needy persons who otherwise might not he able to
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Procedural aspects as well as the substantive law of the summary
dispossess action have been challenged by Legal Services attorneys.
The summary dispossess statute contains authority for broad substituted service of process. Whenever a summons or complaint
cannot be personally served, a copy may be posted or affixed "upon
the door or other conspicuous part of such premises. Such posting
shall be deemed to be lawful service.- 28 3 Many low-income tenants
28 4
were subjected to abuses of the substituted service of process.
In Ortiz v. Engelbrecht,2 8 5 a default judgment had been entered
against the tenant in a dispossess proceeding. 2 6 Alleging that she
had never received any notice of the action, the tenant challenged
the constitutionality of the posting provision of the statute. 2 7 A
class action was filed and the convening of a three-judge court requested, but the federal district court denied the application and
dismissed the complaint. 288 The Third Circuit reversed, holding
that "a valid cause of action against the landlord and the constable"
had been stated.2 89 It remanded the matter to the district court for
obtain adequate living quarters. The facilities which they manage are merely tools to be used to meet the public need for low-rent housing. This objective is thwarted if eligible tenants are wrongfully evicted; even the most undeserving and undesirable tenant is entitled to due process.
Id. at 78, 290 A.2d at 163--64. Self-restraint on the part of the housing authority in the
exercise of the power did not validate the lease provision. Id. at 78, 290 A.2d at 164.
The court rendered both declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of the
lease provision. Id. at 79, 290 A.2d at 164.
Where a lease does comply with requirements of specific grounds for removal
and contains provisions for required notices, it must be strictly adhered to. Housing
Authority v. Isler, 127 N.J. Super. 568, 572-73, 318 A.2d 432, 434-35 (App. Div.
1974). For an earlier Legal Services chalienge to the evictiou- practiccs of local public housing authorities see Randell v. Newark Housing Authority, 384 F.2d 151 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
283 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-54 (1952).
284 Bruno, supra note 165, at 306-07. The author states:
Too often, however, process servers do not even attempt to serve the tenant
personally, but rather rely strictly upon the substituted service. Many tenants
state that they first discovered the complaint and summons stuffed in their
mailbox or wedged into the crack of their apartment door. Such methods are
not only unlawfil but are demeaning to the court's dignity and credibility
in the eyes of the community. Other tenants emphatically state, after being
evicted from their apartment, that they never received any kind of court
notice about a pending lawsuit by their landlord.
Id. at 306 (footnotes omitted). As an alternative the author suggests a combination of
posting and mailing in order to give the tenant adequate notice. Id. at 306-07.
285 474 F.2d 977 (3d Cir. 1973).

Id. at 978.
Id. at 977-78.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 978.
288
287
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consideration of the class action issue and whether the controversy
290
had become moot.
On remand, 2 91 the district judge found that the case had become
moot as a result of the tenant's having moved, but decided to examine
the issue because of its "importance.- 292 The tenant's absence also
deprived the class of a representative. 29 3 Addressing the request for
a three-judge court to consider the constitutionality of service by
posting, the court held that the claim was "insubstantial" for several
reasons.2 94 It emphasized the inadequacy of the factual record before
it. There was no way of knowing "whether the court officer did in
fact attempt and exhaust the preferred methods of service with
failure before making service by posting on the door. "295 The court
reviewed the New Jersey cases, statutes, and related court rules in
the area. 296 Apparently because he perceived the summary dispossess action as an in rem proceeding and "an action of exceedingly
narrow scope, culminating in a judgment of very limited effect,"
the district judge found no significant problems with the use of this
form of substituted service to evict a tenant. 29 7 In passing, the court
had noted the unreliability of current mail deliveries as an alternative means of service. 298 Although it refused to certify the class
and convene a three-judge court, the district court declined to dismiss the action. It ordered a plenary hearing after which it would
render a declaratory judgment. 299 There is no final published decision.
While the direct federal court challenge was unsuccessful, the
manner of service of process has been reformed. Effective September 8, 1975, the rules of court for district court practice were

291

Id.
61 F.R.D. 381 (D.N.J. 1973).

292

Id.

293

Id. Judge Biunno further commented that the alleged class was "far too broad

290

at 386.

and diffuse." Id. at 395. He found no data to support a class of tenants against whom
defaults had been entered after service by posting. Additionally, he stated: "Notice
is inherently inevitable." The tenant would find out about the dispossess action when
a constable came to execute the warrant of removal. Id.
294
295

Id. at 388-95.
Id. at 387, 393. The tenant's affidavits indicated that no papers were received,

but did not explicitly address whether "no knocking on the door, or no ringing of the
bell or buzzer [was heard], or that the bell or buzzer was out of order." Id. at 393-94.
Another affidavit stated that neighborhood children came into the building and tore
down notices and removed mail from mailboxes. Id. at 394.
2916Id. at 388-93.

Id. at 389.
Id. at 387.
299 Id. at 395.
297

298

1976]

LEGAL SERVICES

amended to require that service in landlord-tenant dispossess proceedings be effected "by ordinary mail and by either delivery personally . . . or by affixing a copy of the summons and complaint on

the door of the subject premises." 30 0 The combination of mailing
and posting should reduce the number of default judgments for
possession.
The procedure of a landlord-tenant trial is generally informal.
Nevertheless, a court rule was believed to authorize a complete
jury trial on one day's notice. 30 1 In Alfour Inc. v. Lightfoot,3 0 2 however, the trial judge held that tenants in a summary dispossess proceeding had no right to a jury trial.3 0 3 The tenants in Alfour had
based their demand upon the state constitution,3 0 4 a statute, 30 5 and
the court rule. 30 6 The court held that since there is a constitutional
right to a jury trial only in actions recognized by the common law
at the time the state constitution was adopted in 1776 and the summary dispossess act had been passed only in 1847, there was no such
right.3 0 7 Reviewing the history of the summary dispossess action
from its creation in 1847, the court noted that while there had originally been a jury provision,3 0 8 that clause was omitted in a supple300

N.J.R. 6:2-3(b) (emphasis added). Previously the court rules only recognized

some mode of personal service if the tenant was within the state. See N.J.R. 6:2-3(b)
(1973). However, despite the obvious textual requirement of the rule, the practice of
posting under the statute continued and was construed as personal service under the
rule. A short-lived amendment to the rule was made in April 1975. It authorized
service "by ordinary mail or by delivery personally .. .and by affixing a copy" of the
court papers on the tenant's door. N.J.R. 6:2-3(b) (1975) (emphasis added). This
amendment was made "in apparent response to the voiced difficulty of landlords in
effecting traditional service." S. PRESSLER, CURRENT NEW jERsSEY COURT RULES,
N.J.R. 6:2-3, comment 2 (1975).
301 Bruno, supra note 165, at 299-300. See N.J.R. 6:5-3(a) (1972), as amended,
N.J.R. 6:5-3(a). The rule originally provided:
In summary actions between landlord and tenant . . . the demand shall be
filed and served and the fee paid by the demanding party at least one day
before the return day of the summ1ons.

N.J.R. 6:5-3(a) (1972). Jury trials, however, were extremely rare. Bruno, supra at 300
& n.10.
302 123 N.J. Super. 1, 301 A.2d 197 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1973).
303 Id. at 3-4, 301 A.2d at 198.
304 Id. at 3, 301 A.2d at 198. See N.J. CONST. art. 1,
9.
305 123 N.J. Super. at 3-4, 301 A.2d at 198. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-16 (1952)
which provides: "Either party to any action commenced in a county district court
may demand a trial by jury." (Emphasis added.)
306 123 N.J. Super. at 4, 301 A.2d at 198. See N.J.R. 6:5-3(a) (1972), as amended,
N.J.R. 6:5-3(a). The relevant text of this rule is reproduced in note 301 supra.
307 123 N.J. Super. at 8-9, 301 A.2d at 201.
308 Id. at 4-5, 301 A.2d at 198-99. See Law of Mar. 4, 1847, § 5, [1847] N.J. Laws 143
(jury of six), as amended, Law of Mar. 8, 1848, § 1, [1848] N.J. Laws 185 (ury of twelve).
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mental enactment in 1888.309 The proceedings were thereafter
characterized as " 'summary actions.' "310 The court found that this
statutory characterization precluded a jury trial.3 1 1 Comparing the
relief available in a summary dispossess action with that in an ejectment proceeding, 312 it concluded that only the latter type of action
was covered by the constitutional provision, statute, and rule cited
by the tenants. 31 3 The court also held, in effect, that the rule authorizing a jury trial in a dispossess proceeding was meaningless.
31 4
A "summary action" with a jury trial was a contradiction in terms.
The court added another reason for denying the jury demand, which
was "peculiar" to the court's location in the Newark area. 3 15 The
caseload of tenancy actions was very heavy; requiring jury trials would
cause intolerable backlogs and result in burdens on landlords who
could not regain possession, thus increasing the possibility of resi3 16
dential abandonment by owners.
The court's constitutional-common law conclusion may be
questionable. 3 1 7 Its determination that the statute providing that
"[e]ither party to any action commenced in a county district court
may demand a trial by jury"3 1 8 applies only to landlord-tenant eject309 123 N.J. Super. at 5, 301 A.2d at 199, See Law of Apr. 23, 1888, ch. 308, [1888]
N.J. Laws 462-63.
310 123 N.J. Super. at 5, 301 A.2d at 199. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (1952),
as amended, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 18-53 (Supp. 1975-76).
311 123 N.J. Super. at 5, 301 A.2d at 199.
312 Id. at 5-8, 301 A.2d at 199-201. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35-1 et seq. (1952).
313 123 N.J. Super. at 8, 301 A.2d at 201.
314 Id. at 10-11, 301 A.2d at 202.
315 Id. at 11, 301 A.2d at 203.
316 Id. at 11-12, 301 A.2d at 203.
317 In Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974), the Supreme Court held
that the seventh amendment required a jury trial in a District of Columbia eviction
action for nonpayment. It found that distinctions between title (the usual issue in
ejectment) and possession were immaterial to the common law for jury trial purposes.
Id. at 370-71. The test for a jury trial was not whether the particular action was known
to the common law, but whether "the action involves rights and remedies of the sort
traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than an action in equity or admiralty."
Id. at 375. The seventh amendment civil jury guarantee has not been made enforceable
against the states. I C. ANTINEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7:17, at 549
(1969). Nevertheless, the position of the Court may be persuasive authority. Justice
Marshall also addressed the question of the landlord's speedy recovery of the premises:
Some delay, of course, is inherent in any fair-minded system of justice.
A landlord-tenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be resolved with
due process of law unless both parties have had a fair opportunity to present
their cases. Our courts were never intended to serve as rubber stamps for
landlords seeking to evict their tenants, but rather to see that justice be
done before a man is evicted from his home.
416 U.S. at 385.
318 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-16 (1952).
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ment actions and not landlord-tenant dispossess proceedings 3 19 is
undoubtedly erroneous. Ejectment actions cannot be brought in the
32 0
district court.
In any event, the holding in Alfour has been effectuated through
a court rule on procedure. The district court jury demand rule was
amended to delete any reference to landlord-tenant matters. 3 21 The
general provisions of the rule require a jury demand to be made
within ten days after an answer is filed. 3 22 However, no answers are
3 23
permitted to be filed in summary dispossess actions.
Legal Services attorneys and some trial courts have challenged
the warrant of removal, the procedure for enforcing eviction judgments. A statute authorizes the court to stay the issuance of the
warrant of removal of a residential tenant for up to six months if it
appears that "the tenant will suffer hardship because of the unavailability of other dwelling accommodations." 32 4 The statute further provides that the stay may be granted and may continue only if all rent
arrearages plus court costs and current rent are paid, future rent
due during the stay is paid, the tenant is not disorderly, and the
3 25
tenant does not willfully damage the premises.
In Ivy Hill Park Section Five, Inc. v. Handa,3 28 a judgment for
possession on grounds of nonpayment was entered. The trial judge
stayed the warrant of removal for two and a half months. The landlord
appealed. The appellate division summarily reversed, holding that
"the plain language" of the statute required that a stay could only
be granted "on the payment of past and future rent due to the landlord." 32 7 The court held that the county district court judge had no
3 28
jurisdiction to issue such a stay.
Jurisdictional limitations were also imposed in Housing Authority v. West, 329 where the trial judge attempted to cope with a
landlord that had inordinately delayed bringing suit, with the re123 N.J. Super. at 8, 301 A.2d at 201.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35-1 (1952).
321 See N.J.R. 6:5-3(a). Citing Alfour, the comment to the rule states: "This rule
was further amended . . . to make clear that there is no right to a jury trial in a summary dispossess action." S. PRESSLER, CURRENT NEW JERSEY COURT RULES, N.J.R.
6:5-3, comment 1 (1975).
322 N.J.R. 6:5-3(a).
323 N.J.R. 6:3-1.
324 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (Supp. 1975-76).
319
320

325

Id.

121 N.J. Super. 366, 297 A.2d 201 (App. Div. 1972).
Id. at 367, 297 A.2d at 201-02.
328 Id. at 367, 297 A.2d at 202.
321 132 N.J. Super. 229, 333 A.2d 290 (App. Div.) (1975), aff'd, 69 N.J. 293, 354
A.2d 65 (1976).
326

327
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sponsibility of the tenant to pay rent, and with the realities of the
housing shortage. Judgment for possession had been entered, but
the warrant was stayed on the condition that the tenant pay arrearages
at the rate of $100 a month in addition to her regular rent. 330 Because
of the large amount of arrearages that had accumulated, this denied
3 31
the landlord possession of the premises for twenty-two months.
The Housing Authority appealed. Relying upon Ivy Hill, the appellate division tersely vacated the stay and ordered the issuance
3 32
of the warrant of removal.
132 N.J. Super. at 230, 333 A.2d at 291.
331 Id. The total amount of the arrearages was $2,199. Id. The Housing Authority
landlord had delayed instituting suit for almost two years.
32 Id. The New Jersey supreme court recently affirmed this determination of the
330

appellate division. Housing Authority of Newark v. West, 69 N.J. 293, 295, 354 A.2d 65,
69(1976).
A majority of the court held that the landlord was entitled to appeal a summary
dispossess judgment in its favor where there was an issue of " 'lack of jurisdiction' "
and that the trial court had lacked the jurisdictional power to enter the order staying
execution of the judgment for nearly two years. Id. at 297-98, 300-01, 354 A.2d at 67-68,
69 (quoting from N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952)). It found that the county district
court had no general equitable power to stay the dispossess judgment and that the statute authorizing stays in hardship situations was to be construed strictly. 69 N.J. at
300--01, 354 A.2d at 69 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (Supp. 1975-76)). In reaching this conclusion, the majority held that the landlord was not "estopped to bring the
action for 'prejudicial delay' in instituting it." 69 N.J. at 296, 354 A.2d at 67. Writing for
the majority, Judge Conford stated that the delay resulting from the landlord's failure to
immediately respond to a rent strike and the tenant's failure to place the rent money in
escrow did not give rise to prejudice "in any sense as to which we can take cognizance."

id.
Justice Pashman filed a lengthy dissent. He would have found jurisdictional
authority for the county district court's stay in an "inherent equitable power" of courts to
control their cases and judgments. Id. at 313-16, 354 A.2d at 76-77. However, he considered the resolution of that question and the resulting issue of the landlord's right to
appeal the stayed judgment for possession to be "of secondary importance." Id. at 302,
354 A.2d at 70.
His primary concern was the validation of the judgment "in the face of the landlord's substantial and unexplained delay in bringing suit." Id. at 304, 354 A.2d at 71.
Rather than pertaining to a defense of estoppel or laches, the nearly two-year delay was
perceived by Justice Pashman as raising an issue of whether the landlord's action was
still within "the jurisdictional power of the District Court sitting in a summary dispossess proceeding." Id. "[O]n the basis of the summary nature of the proceedings brought
under NJ.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq. and the legislative intent behind that statute," Justice
Pashman concluded that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action. Id.
The dissent reviewed the lack of formality and procedural safeguards in a summary dispossess proceeding, the expeditiousness with which such actions are handled,
and the statute's acknowledged purpose " 'to give the landlord a quick remedy for possession.' " Id. at 304-06, 354 A.2d at 71-72 (quoting from Vineland Shopping Center,
Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 462, 173 A.2d 270, 272 (1961)). The speedy possessory remedy of the statute not only allowed a landlord to regain possession promptly but also
to secure "a resumption of rental income from that property as quickly as possible." 69
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These cases do not satisfactorily resolve the authority of a district court to stay execution of a judgment for possession. The statute
speaks of "sound discretion" in granting stays. 33 3 It is not clear that
the statutory provisions constitute absolute limits on the court's
power. For example, despite the lack of explicit authority, a court
undoubtedly has the discretion and jurisdictional power to stay the
3 34
warrant of removal to allow an attempt at an appeal.
N.J. at 305, 354 A.2d at 71. This observation by Justice Pashman that a landlord is not
normally interested in bare possession of the premises but in the rental income to be
derived from the leasing of possessory rights seems unquestionable. Justice Pashman
accordingly concluded: -[N]ot only does the legislative scheme entail suminary disposition of eviction cases, but it presupposes prompt institution of such cases as well."
Id. at 306, 354 A.2d at 72 (emphasis in original).
Justice Pashman bolstered his argument as to legislative intent regarding this jurisdictional limitation on the county district court in two ways. He referred to the existence
of a specific alternative remedy where there were rent arrearages for a year or more. Id. at
307, 354 A.2d at 72-73. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-7 (1952). The provisions of this
statute are outlined in note 218 supra. The remedy of this proceeding is not as expeditious as that of a summary dispossess action. Justice Pashman found this "logical." If the
landlord allows the statutory amount of arrearages to accumulate, "then it would seem
that the landlord lacks a substantial interest in a quick remedy." 69 N.J. at 307, 354 A.2d
at 73. Allowing use of the summary dispossess action in such a situation would render
this alternative remedy meaningless. Id. The other basis of support for the dissent's
position came from several New York cases interpreting an eviction statute comparable
to the summary dispossess act. These decisions found that the New York statute imposed jurisdictional limits of the nature perceived by Justice Pashman in the legislative
intent of the summary dispossess act. Id. at 308-09, 354 A.2d at 73-74. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Simons, 77 Misc. 2d 184, 187, 353 N.Y.S.2d 589, 591-92 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings
County 1973); Gramford Realty Corp. v. \7alentin, 71 Misc. 2d 784, 786, 337 N.Y.S.2d
160, 163 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1972) (construing N.Y. REAL PRop. ACTIONS
LAW § 711 (MlcKinney 1963)).
333 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-i0.6 (Supp. 1975-76).
334 The New Jersey supreme court tacitly approved this procedure in Kruvant v.
Sunrise Mkt., Inc., 58 N.J. 452, 279 A.2d 104, judgment amended, 59 N.J. 330, 282
A.2d 746 (1971). A commercial lease provided for arbitration of disputes. 58 N.J. at
454-55, 279 A.2d at 105. The district court entered judgment for possession because
the tenant failed to pay rent pending arbitration, but stayed the issuance of the warrant pending appeal on condition that the rent was paid into escrow. Id. at 454, 279
A.2d at 105. The supreme court stated that the tenant could not be dispossessed pending arbitration but nevertheless affirmed the judgment and stayed the warrant until
after arbitration was concluded. Id. at 456, 279 A.2d at 105-06.
A 1974 landlord-tenant statute also suggests that the district court has discretion beyond the express limits of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (Supp. 1975-76). The
new enactment requires that when a warrant of removal is issued the tenant must
receive written notice of the tenant's right to apply to the district court "for a stay of
execution of the warrant." Id. § 2A:42-10.16. There is no express limit placed upon
the power of the court to grant the stay. It is unlikely that the legislature intended
to require a tenant to go to court to find out that all rent must immediately be paid.
Refusal to recognize discretion such as was exercised in Ivy Hill and West rapidly
enforces the landlord's right to possession. But the landlord is interested in the rentnot possession. A stay conditioned upon installment payments of the arrearages in
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The right to appeal summary dispossess judgments is also involved in Ivy Hill and West. Review under the act is not available
"except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.- 3 3 5 The statute
does
provide for pretrial discretionary removal to the superior court if the
case presents an issue of "sufficient importance. "336 There is a normal
right of appeal, as well as other procedural rights such as jury trials,
in a transferred action. 3 3 7 However, there is little guidance for the
33 8
use of the removal device.
Despite the statutory language, appellate courts have circumvented this limitation on judicial power by holding that "[w]hatever
'jurisdiction' means in other settings, here it uniquely connotes the
existence of one of the factual situations" giving rise to a cause of
action under the statute.33 9 Not only the effectiveness 3 40 but also
the wisdom of the limitation on appeals has been questioned. Writing
in Marini, Justice Haneman stated:
We see no sound reason for any distinction between the right to
appeal from a District Court judgment and a Superior Court judgment for possession. It might well be urged that there should be
no difference between the scope of review from a District Court
34 1
judgment and a Superior Court judgment.

The landlord has a legitimate interest in quickly regaining
possession and being protected from frivolous appeals. However,
addition to current rent provides this remedy. While the supreme court in its recent affirmance in Housing Authority of Newark v. West, 69 N.J. 293, 354 A.2d 65 (1976) did
not adopt this view, it stated:
The foregoing is not to say that the court does not have inherent discretion, as district court judges have assumed for decades, to stay the warrant for
a reasonable time to permit a tenant in distressed circumstances to arrange
for his voluntary removal from the premises.
Id. at 300-01, 354 A.2d at 69.
335 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-59 (1952).
3
36 Id. § 2A: 18-60.
337id. § 2A: 18-61.
338 The lack of guidance in the statute was noted in Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
140 n.1, 265 A.2d 526, 531 (1970). For a case allowing transfer see Morrocco v. Felton,
112 N.J. Super. 226, 270 A.2d 739 (L. Div. 1970). Removal was denied in Academy
Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 261 A.2d 413 (L. Div. 1970).
339 Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 138-39, 265 A.2d 526, 530 (1970).
340In Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 173 A.2d 270
(1961), Chief Justice Weintraub noted that there was some doubt whether the legislative objective of nonappealability had ever been achieved because of judicial hostility to it. Id. at 462, 173 A.2d at 272.
341 56 N.J. at 140 n.1, 265 A.2d at 531. Just before Marini was decided, the need
for possible revision of the statute was identified as an issue for further study in
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that interest must be balanced against the interest of tenants in
remaining in their homes and preventing the break-up of their
families because adequate shelter cannot immediately be obtained
in the current housing shortage. Trial judges do make errors. The
competing interests of landlord and tenant may be best reconciled
by repealing the limitation on appealability. The sifting of frivolous
and unmeritorious appeals can be accomplished by the discretionary
power to grant stays. 342 The "jurisdiction" bar of the statute and
the resulting judicial interpretations are an unnecessary artifice.
Access to Housing

Many of the problems that result in the landlord-tenant relationship are caused by a statewide housing shortage. Landlords
often have little interest in maintaining or rehabilitating their buildings because they know that regardless of the condition, someone in
need of a modicum of shelter will rent the apartment. When a tenant
complains about an uninhabitable situation, the landlord need not
fear significant rent loss from eviction because the demand for
housing far exceeds the supply. The summary dispossess action has
aided in implementing the landlord's economic objectives.
The landlord's power position in the housing market has received
substantial support from local zoning practices. Restrictions on
minimum lot size and floor area and prohibitions of multiple-dwelling use have intensified the housing shortage and the plight of the
3 43
low-income tenant trapped in urban slums.
342

N.J.R. 2:9-5(a) provides that the filing of an appeal does not stay a judgment.

A stay may be ordered "with or without terms." id.
In addition to recommending repeal of the limitation on appeals, an earlier
writer noted that pretrial discovery could still be restricted and an early trial date
given in order to retain "the basic summary nature of the proceeding." Bruno, supra
note 165, at 308 & n.51.
Elimination of the jurisdictional bar to appeal was urged even earlier, with

strong language and a firm grasp of the consequences of an eviction:
The statute should be amended. District Court judges should not be the
courts of last resort in matters of such great importance as the possession of
real property. The remedy by suit for damages is in fact wholly inadequate
and the ruling of the Court of Errors and Appeals that money damages can
fully compensate for illegal deprivation of possession is unrealistic.
Fulop, The Course of a Civil Action in the District Courts, 3 RUTGERS L. REV. 180,
215 n.18 (1949). For a recent call for legislative action see Housing Authority of Newark
v. Vest, 69 N.J. 293, 298, 354 A.2d 65, 68 (1976) ("an undertaking obviously needed").
343 The impact of zoning on the conditions under which tenants live was recognized in NEW JERSEY LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP STUDY COMM'N, INTERIM REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR & LEGISLATURE 2, 40 (1970). It identified "abusive local zoning practices" as one of the factors indicating "'dismal prospects for relief from the overall housing shortage." Id. at 2.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7: 233

Legal Services attorneys secured a significant victory over
exclusionary zoning practices in Southern Burlington County
N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel.3 44 After an extensive review of the exclusionary devices employed by developing municipalities in the line of urban expansion, 3 4 5 Justice Hall, writing for the supreme court, held:
We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land
use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity of the classes of
people mentioned for low and moderate income housing and in
its regulations must affirmatively afford that opportunity, at least
to the extent of the municipality's fair share of the present and
prospective regional need therefor. These obligations must be
met unless the particular municipality can sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating peculiar circumstances which dictate that
346
it should not be required so to do.

The court found that the need for housing was inherent in the
"general welfare" that must be advanced by a municipality's enactments: "There cannot be the slightest doubt that shelter, along with
food, are the most basic human needs.- 3 47 It further stated that the
municipality "must permit multi-family housing, without bedroom
or similar restrictions. "348 The court also noted "at least a moral
344 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 96 S. Ct. 18 (1975), aff'g as mlodified 119 N.J. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (L. Div. 1972).
For a discussion of remedies for exclusionary zoning in light of Mt. Laurel see
\Mytelka & Mytelka, supra note 39.
345 67 N.J. at 161-73, 336 A.2d at 718-24.
346 Id. at 174, 336 A.2d at 724-25 (footnote omitted). The court's determination
was based upon the state constitution and not federal constitutional principles. Id. at
174, 336 A.2d at 725.
347 Id. at 178, 336 A.2d at 727. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-32 (1967). The court
emphasized that promotion of the general welfare was also a constitutional requirement. 67 N.J. at 175, 336 A.2d at 725. For purposes of constitutional scrutiny, it characterized "the basic importance of housing and local regulations restricting its availability to substantial segments of the population" as being a "fundamental" question.
Id. Federal courts, on the other hand, have consistently denied the status of "fundamental interest" to access-to-housing claims. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, 73-74 (1972); Citizens Comm. for Faraday Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065, 1068
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
348 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 732. Because of the context of the case, involving
as it did low-income plaintiffs, the court must have envisioned "multi-family housing" as meaning apartments as opposed to condominiums or duplexes. This is an implicit overruling of cases holding that the zoning power cannot regulate the form of
ownership or occupancy but only the physical use. See Bridge Park Co. v. Borough of
Highland Park, 113 N.J. Super. 219, 221-22, 273 A.2d 397, 398-99 (App. Div. 1971);
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obligation" on the part of the municipality to implement its statutory power to establish a local public housing authority "to provide
housing for its resident poor now living in dilapidated, unhealthy
34 9
quarters."
CONCLUSION

The cases discussed in this article are among the most controversial and successful of those initiated by Legal Services attorneys.
Furthermore, many of these cases have had an enduring impact on
the evolution of a more equitable body of substantive law. Yet, it
is all too easy to overemphasize these more dramatic, law-reform
directed cases and to forget that they comprise only a small percentage of the day-to-day caseload handled by the 2500 Legal Services attorneys. It is through this daily regimen of service provided
by dedicated attorneys that our nation's disaffected and alienated
poor are slowly coming to believe that, properly used within the
system, the law can function to assist them.
Moreover, the success of Legal Services in the representation
of the poor has had the collateral effect of focusing the attention of
the bar to the legitimate demand of middle-class Americans that they,
too, be afforded reasonably-priced legal assistance. Not poor enough
to qualify for free legal aid, yet unable to afford high-priced private
counsel, the middle class has become justifiably embittered.
As a response to these demands, new programs such as prepaid legal services, public interest law firms, and middle income
legal clinics have been springing up throughout the nation. Furthermore, some states have been experimenting with agencies which
act a-, ombudsmen for its eitizens- and New Jersey has gone even
further, establishing a Department of the Public Advocate. Thus,
an initial awareness of the inadequacy of legal representation for the
nation's poor, an awareness which gave rise to the Legal Services
projects, has blossomed into a national concern over the quality and
availability of legal services at every income level. Despite restrictions which may hinder representation, the country and the profession have committed themselves to a concept long articulated and
only belatedly in the process of being achieved.
Maplewood Village Tenants Ass'n v. Maplewood Village, 116 N.J. Super. 372, 377-78,
282 A.2d 428, 431 (Ch. 1971).
349 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A.2d at 734. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:14A-1 et seq. (1964).

